University of Miami Law Review
Volume 48

Number 1

Article 3

9-1-1993

Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of
Consideration
Mark B. Wessman

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48
U. Miami L. Rev. 45 (1993)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol48/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An
Examination of the Doctrine of
Consideration
MARK

I.
II.

B.

WESSMAN*

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................
DOCTRINES OF ASSENT ...................................................
A. Complete Failure of Agreement .......................................
B. Failure to Reach the Final Stages of Assent ............................
C. Indefiniteness ......................................................
D. The Objective Theory of Assent .......................................
E. The Primacy of Assent ..............................................

II .

45

CONSIDERATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO, OR SUBSTITUTE FOR, APPLICATION OF

CONSIDERATION AS A POLICING DEVICE .....................................

A. Considerationas an Alternate Method of Policing Misconduct
........................................
in Bargaining.............
1. FRAUD AND FRAUD ON CREDITORS ..................................
2. DURESS ........................................................
3.

UNDUE INFLUENCE ...............................................

4.

THE DANGER:

DECISIONS IN DISGUISE AND UNDERENFORCEMENT ............

B. ConsiderationDoctrine as a Covert Way of Policingfor Fairness..........
C. ConsiderationDoctrine and Disguised Policy Judgments .................
IV. ADDITIONAL HARM CAUSED BY THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION ..................
A. Use of the Doctrine of Considerationto Avoid Decision of Evidentiary
Questions .........................................................
B. Distraction and Confusion in Promissory Estoppel Cases .................
C. Complexity, Uneven Application, and Underenforcement ..................

52
53
55
58
61
65
69
69
69
74

78
80

86
93
97
98
100
101

1.

PAST CONSIDERATION/MORAL CONSIDERATION ..............................

103

2.

ILLUSORY PROMISES AND NON-STANDARD REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS .....

105

3. ILLUSORY PROMISES AND SATISFACTION CLAUSES ...........................
D. An Advance Response to Fanciful Hypotheticals.........................
V . CONCLUSION ............................................................

I.

II

114
116

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of consideration is decidedly out of fashion these
days. Undoubtedly, the fact that a promise is supported by traditional
consideration usually provides a sufficient reason to enforce it.' To the
* Associate Professor, Tulane Law School. I thank Paul Barron, Lissa L. Broome, Jeanne
Carriere, James D. Gordon III, Shael Herman, Julie H. Jackson, Marjorie Kornhauser, Suman
Naresh, Vernon Palmer, Robert K. Rasmussen, Steve Thel, and Ann Woolhandler for reading
prior drafts of this Article. I also thank Heather R. Boshak, Alan M. Fisch, and Eric Zentner for
helpful research assistance.
1. JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFrS AND PROMISES 220-21 (1980). Dawson argued that an
appropriately limited doctrine of consideration expressed
an idea that has been accepted for centuries in Anglo-American law: that a
sufficient reason for enforcing a promise is that it is part of an agreed exchange
which would enable each party to secure from the other an act or result that he
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extent that the doctrine of consideration is identified with the proposition that bargains should generally be enforced, the doctrine is very
much alive. The classical contract theorists, however, included a second
proposition within the "doctrine of consideration." They asserted that
consideration was a necessary condition for the enforcement of a promise; they thus assigned to the doctrine of consideration a gatekeeping
function.2 The doctrine of consideration sorted promises into two
classes, bargain promises and gratuitous promises. The former were
admitted to the realm of contract, and the latter were consigned to outer
darkness. It is this gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration
that is now so out of fashion among academics. It is also the subject of
this Article, and I shall henceforth use the phrase "doctrine of consideration" to refer to the view that only promises supported by consideration
should be enforced.
The current attack on the doctrine of consideration has been build-

ing for some time. A little less than twenty years ago, Gilmore
advanced the thesis that contract, and "the balance wheel of the great

machine,"3 the doctrine of consideration, were in the process of reabsorption into tort. Gilmore attributed this process to the rise of promissory estoppel.' While subsequent scholarship on promissory estoppel
has provided good reason to doubt Gilmore's view that contract as a
whole is being eaten up by tort,5 it has nonetheless confirmed the impor-

tance and frequency of reliance-based recovery as an alternative to
recovery based on bargain. 6 It is difficult to avoid the impression that
any promises stopped at the gate of consideration are likely to gain
sought. There are other exceptional reasons for enforcing promises, but this is
overwhelmingly the normal one.
Id. While the presence of consideration "usually" justifies enforcement of a promise, there are
thoroughly uncontroversial exceptions to the general rule that bargains are enforced. For example,
bargains subject to defenses of fraud, duress, incapacity, undue influence, mistake, illegality, or
unconscionability may very well qualify as bargains, but various policy or moral reasons militate
against their enforcement. In addition, there are some bargains that are too casual or trivial to
justify enforcement. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. Appropriately qualified,
however, Dawson's generalization is difficult to dispute.
2. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 18-34 (1974) (describing the classical
theory of consideration).
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id. at 87.
5. See generally Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The PromissoryBasis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111 (1991) (arguing that courts tend to enforce, with expectancy damages where possible,
promises deliberately made, using the presence of reliance as an indication of deliberation).
6. See generally Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities,and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987); Mary
E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131 (1987); Daniel A. Farber &
John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: ContractLaw and the "Invisible Handshake,"
52 U. CH. L. REv. 903 (1985); Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Yorio & Thel, supra note 5.
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entrance through the back door of promissory estoppel.
While it is clear Gilmore had no plans to mourn the death of the
"requirement" of consideration (or the classical theory of which it was a
part), he was apparently content to illustrate the waning of the requirement.8 Other scholars have attacked the doctrine of consideration more
directly and enthusiastically. Professor Fried has assailed the so-called
"requirement" of consideration as internally incoherent and inconsistent
with the moral foundation of the enforcement of promises. 9 Economic
theorists have suggested that gains in utility could be produced by recognizing a class of enforceable gratuitous promises.' 0 Indeed, it has been
suggested that much of the good work accomplished by the doctrine of
consideration could be done by other doctrines'1 and that the use of the
doctrine of2 consideration by judges is generally superfluous or
pretextual.1
One of the difficulties with the recent frontal assaults on the doctrine of consideration, however, is that they tend to be relatively abstract.
They pay insufficient attention to the various maneuvers judges actually
perform with the aid of the doctrine of consideration. Given the volume
and clear trend of the scholarly criticism, one would expect that, in the
years since Gilmore's book was published, cases in which promises are
held unenforceable for lack of consideration would have virtually disappeared from the reports. It might not be surprising to find the ritual
incantation that consideration is a "requirement" or "element" of a valid
contract. Retention of the "requirement" of consideration as a mere rhetorical salute to the past would be an example of the survival of a common law rule as a verbal formula after its substantive bite was lost. If
the critics of the doctrine of consideration are correct, however, decisions in which the doctrine of consideration functions as a gatekeeper
should be extremely rare products of backwater courts in which the gospel according to Gilmore has not been heard or heeded.
If the old gatekeeper has been fired, however, someone forgot to
7. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 6, at 930 (suggesting that any promise made in
furtherance of an economic activity is, as a practical matter, enforceable). See generally James D.
Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1991)

(suggesting that all promises that are commercial or relate to exchange should be enforceable)
[hereinafter Gordon, Consideration]; James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of
Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Dialogue].
8. See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 55-85.
9. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 28-39 (1981).
10. See Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (1992);
Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977).
11. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.22, at 294-95 (2d ed. 1990) (referring

specifically to the preexisting duty rule); Gordon, Consideration, supra note 7; Gordon, Dialogue,
supra note 7; Malcolm P. Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 COLUM. L. Rv. 783, 796-97 (1941).
12. See Kull, supra note 10, at 40-46.
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tell large numbers of judges. Often, the requirement of consideration is
still expressly used as a gatekeeper. Since the mid-1970s, there have
been more than 300 reported cases in which the enforcement of a promise has been denied or placed in serious peril on the ground of lack of
consideration. 13 The doctrine of consideration thus presents a somewhat
puzzling divergence of theory and doctrinal development. No academic
today would seriously assert a descriptive claim that consideration is a
necessary condition for the enforcement of a promise. Nevertheless,
judges talk and act as if it were. They decline to enforce promises, citing the absence of consideration as a reason. Cases that theoretically
should occur rarely, if at all, are found with a frequency that would, I
believe, surprise most contracts teachers and scholars.' 4 Accordingly, a
critical examination of those cases is necessary to determine whether the
judges are simply misguided or whether the doctrine of consideration
does useful work that our theories have overlooked.
If the critics of the doctrine of consideration are correct, an analysis
of the cases in which a promise is held unenforceable due to lack of
consideration (or in which that possibility is left open on remand) should
yield troublesome results. At the very least, one would expect to find
cases of the following kinds: (a) cases in which the application of the
doctrine of consideration was superfluous, in the sense that it yielded a
desirable result that could have been reached just as easily on other
grounds; (b) cases in which the doctrine of consideration was used as a
pretext to reach a result desired for entirely different, and perhaps
unstated or disreputable, reasons; and (c) cases in which the application
of the doctrine of consideration resulted in an undesirable disposition.
One would expect to find a doctrine that, in operation, is alternately
13. I am interested in a class of cases that includes both cases in which a court makes a final

determination that a particular promise lacks consideration and cases in which an appellate court
finds the issue of consideration inappropriate for summary disposition. In the latter cases, the

appellate court remands the case to a lower court, leaving open the possibility that the lower court
may find an absence of consideration. The entire class of cases forms, in effect, a database for this
article. (A list of the cases used as a database is on file with the author and is available on
request). I shall not discuss, except occasionally for illustrative purposes, the numerous cases in
which courts recite the necessity of consideration and go on to find the requirements of the
doctrine satisfied.

14. Some might object that the number of cases in which the doctrine of consideration is used
as a gatekeeper (roughly twenty a year) does not seem inordinately large in absolute terms. There
are three responses. First, the number in question is only the number of reported cases. As in the
case of other doctrines, one may assume' that not all such applications of the doctrine of

consideration find their way into the reports. Second, because most business contracts are, in fact,
bargains, the issue of consideration will not arise in most contract cases. It is thus surprising to
find so many cases in which the issue of consideration is raised, let alone decided negatively.
Finally, the current literature on the subject of consideration leads one to predict that such cases

will almost never occur.
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superfluous, deceptive, or harmful and that could be eliminated without
serious doctrinal dislocation.
This Article analyzes a significant cross-section 5 of the cases
decided in roughly the last seventeen years1 6 in which the doctrine of

consideration has performed its negative gatekeeping function. My goal
is to ascertain whether those cases support or refute the thesis that the
doctrine can, in principle, be eliminated.
If such an analysis is not to be utterly disjointed, some way of
organizing the cases into manageable groups is necessary. It is customary to think of the doctrine of consideration as a general principle and a
group of corollaries.' 7 The general principle is a requirement that a
promise be part of an exchange of values and that each side of the
exchange induce the other.'" The corollaries, such as the preexisting
duty rule, the doctrine of illusory promises, and the full revocability of
offers, purport to be 19 subsidiary rules that result from the application of

the general principle to specific recurring transaction patterns. In this
Article, I shall examine four of the purported corollaries to the doctrine
of consideration: the rule that illusory promises cannot be considera-

tion,2" the requirement of mutuality of obligation, 2' and the rules that
past consideration2 2 and moral consideration are not sufficient to support
15. Given the number of cases in which consideration is used as a gatekeeper, a discussion of
all of them would produce an article of unmanageable length. I believe that the set of cases
chosen for discussion in this article should yield generalizations that can be extended to the
remainder of the cases for reasons set out infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
16. I chose the cut-off date of 1976 because of my belief that much of the current scholarly
interest in and criticism of the doctrine of consideration is an outgrowth of Grant Gilmore's book,
The Death of Contract, which appeared in 1974. The influence of the critics (if any) would,
accordingly, appear after that date.
17. See B.J. Reiter, Courts, Consideration,and Common Sense, 27 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 439, 441
(1977).
18. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 43-68; GILMORE, supra note 2, at 18-34; OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 292-95 (1881) (considered the most famous statement
of the requirement of mutual inducement).
19. I use the phrase "purport to be" because I do not wish to prejudge the question whether
the subsidiary rules customarily associated with the general requirement of bargained-for
exchange are true corollaries in the strict logical sense. Professor Farnsworth, for example, has
argued that the preexisting duty rule is not a logical entailment of the general requirement of
consideration. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 287; see also Reiter, supra note 17, at 456-58,
471,507.
20. An "illusory promise" may be defined as a purported promise that gives the promisor the
option to perform or not. Illusory promises may take a form substantially equivalent to "I promise
to do X, if I so desire," or they may be apparently substantive promises accompanied by an
unlimited termination right. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a (1979).
21. The requirement of mutuality of obligation may be formulated as the principle that both
parties to a contract must be bound or neither is bound. Cf. infra notes 380-82 and accompanying
text (discussing various exceptions to this formulation).
22. The supposed "rule" that past consideration is no consideration is now subject to a host of
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a contract.2 3
The four corollaries chosen as the subject of this Article are appropriate vehicles for analysis for several reasons. First, Karl Llewellyn
once suggested that the various rules grouped under the topic of "consideration" form no discernible factual or doctrinal unity.2 4 Rather, they

reflect the pressure of a number of different (and possibly inconsistent)
policies in different recurring situations. 2 5 If he is correct, the corollaries are actually more fundamental than the general requirement of

bargained exchange and should be examined first.
Second, there is good reason to pair the illusory promise cases with
the mutuality of obligation cases and to pair the past consideration cases
with the moral consideration cases. The illusory promise cases are just a
subset of the mutuality of obligation cases, 6 and the past consideration
and moral consideration cases largely overlap.27 The four corollaries
thus cover two interlocking or overlapping bodies of cases. Therefore,

each pair of corollaries seems likely to present related problems for
analysis.
Third, each pair of corollaries discussed in this Article illustrates

one of the most common ways in which a purported contract can fail for
lack of consideration. The consideration "requirement" has two aspects:
exchange and mutual inducement. The mutuality of obligation cases
exceptions. See infra notes 383-86 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to the "rule"
that past consideration is no consideration).
23. The term "moral consideration" is ambiguous. Sometimes it refers to one of the
exceptions to the principle of mutuality of obligation-specifically, the exception that permits a
voidable duty or promise to serve as consideration for a return promise. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 (1979). Occasionally, it refers to a set of rules making subsequent
promises to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in bankruptcy or
subsequent promises to perform obligations subject to the defenses of fraud, mistake, incapacity,
duress, or undue influence enforceable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82, 83,
85 (1979). In either of these senses, moral consideration qualifies as (or substitutes for)
consideration, and neither of these senses is relevant to this Article. The relevant use of the term
"moral consideration" occurs in those cases in which a promise is held unenforceable because it is
supported by "mere moral consideration" and is usually equivalent to "mere love and affection,"
"mere gratitude," or "mere moral obligation." The cases denying enforcement to a promise
because it is supported only by moral consideration are few in number, and a substantial number
of the cases in which the issue of "moral consideration" is raised are also cases in which the issue
of past consideration is raised. See Tcherpnin v. Franz, 457 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Womer
Agency, Inc. v. Doyle, 479 N.E.2d 468 (Il. App. Ct. 1985); Schoenfeld v. Ochsenhaut, 452
N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982); Production Credit Ass'n of Mandan v. Rub, 475 N.W.2d 532
(N.D. 1991); Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
24. See Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword,41 COLUM. L.
REv. 777 (1941).
25. Id.
26. If the "promise" of one party to a purported contract is illusory, his performance is
optional and he is not "bound." Under the principle of mutuality, neither is the other party.
27. See supra note 23.
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(including the subset of illusory promise cases) involve situations in
which there is arguably no genuine exchange because one of the parties
is not "bound." In the past consideration cases (and the overlapping
moral consideration cases), on the other hand, the critical defect is an
absence of mutual inducement.2" The four corollaries discussed in this
Article thus represent both of the most common ways in which it is
possible to run afoul of the doctrine of consideration. For that reason, it
is my hope that the conclusions drawn with respect to the corollaries
analyzed in this Article will be applicable to the rest of the cases in
which consideration doctrine functions as a gatekeeper.29
Finally, some of the other corollaries to the doctrine of consideration have already been the subject of sustained, cogent criticism by
others.3" The four corollaries discussed in this Article seem more in
need of fresh examination and appear more likely to reveal whatever
merit the doctrine of consideration still might have.
Ultimately, however, the analysis of the cases applying the four
corollaries provides strong support for the views of the critics of the
doctrine of consideration. Part II of this Article explores the considerable number of cases in which the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration produce case dispositions that are (or could be) produced by
applications of traditional doctrines of assent. The results in such cases
are generally desirable, but the use of consideration doctrine is entirely
redundant. Moreover, the doctrines of assent that produce the same
results are more fundamental to contract law and theory than the doctrine of consideration. Indeed, assent doctrines also do a better job of
screening out a class of promises which scholars generally agree should
not be enforced.
Part III contains an analysis of a range of cases in which courts
28. The corollary that "past consideration is no consideration" follows fairly directly from the

requirement of mutual inducement imposed by the classical theory of consideration. To say that a
promise and its consideration must be "bargained for" normally implies that the promise and its

consideration "bear a reciprocal relation of motive or inducement; the consideration induces the
making of the promise, and the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b; see also GILMORE, supra note 2, at 18-34. If

the purported consideration for a promise is some performance rendered in the past, however, the
requisite reciprocity of inducement is absent. The subsequent promise cannot "induce" or be the

"motive" for what has already happened or been done.
29. It is my hope to explore other corollaries to the doctrine of consideration in a subsequent
article.
30. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, §§ 4.21-4.22 (criticizing the preexisting duty rule);
K.C.T. SUTTON, CONSIDERATION RECONSIDERED 191-264 (1974) (summarizing criticism of
revocability of offers, preexisting duty rule, and claim settlement rules); Karl N. Llewellyn, What
Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 742-43 (1931) (criticizing
modification rules and failure to recognize firm offers); Reiter, supra note 17 (criticizing the

preexisting duty rule).
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appear to be using the doctrine of consideration as a policing device. In
one set of cases, the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration (particularly the rules on past and moral consideration) are used to invalidate
promises in circumstances that suggest defenses based on misconduct,
such as fraud, duress, or undue influence. In some instances, the misconduct-based defense is clearly established, and the doctrine of consideration is once again merely superfluous. In some instances, however,
the doctrine of consideration seems to be used as a substitute for such
defenses. This use produces some adverse effects, including the systematic denial of enforcement to one class of promises (post-loan guaranties) that, in my view, should be enforced. Part III also includes an
analysis of cases in which the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration
are used as methods of policing agreements for fairness-a use to which
they are ill-adapted. Part III concludes with a discussion of a set of
cases in which the corollaries appear to be used to make covert policy
choices, often at the expense of a more rational policy analysis.
Part IV contains an analysis of cases in which applications of the
four corollaries to the doctrine of consideration do further harm, including blocking the enforcement of classes of promises that, in my view,
should be enforced. I conclude that, on balance, the disadvantages of
the four corollaries outweigh any advantages. The benefits of the corollaries can be produced by other traditional contract doctrines, and their
adverse effects confirm the views of the critics who advocate their
abandonment.
II.

CONSIDERATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO, OR SUBSTITUTE FOR,
APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES OF ASSENT

The frequency with which the doctrine of consideration serves as
merely one ground of decision among many that were (or could have
been) used is striking. Equally striking is the frequency with which the
actual or potential alternative ground of decision is one of the rules traditionally regarded as aspects of the requirement of mutual assent. 31 In
such cases, the use of the doctrine of consideration is superfluous in the
sense that whatever work it does can be done as well by one of the
assent doctrines. Because the assent doctrines are more fundamental,32
the doctrine of consideration is the logical candidate for elimination.
However, assent can fail in a variety of ways, and the ways in which
31. In classifying the various rules concerning offer, acceptance, definiteness, and objective
manifestation of assent as aspects of the requirement of mutual assent, I am following the
organizational principle of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979), which collects a
variety of such rules in Chapter 3 under the general heading, "Formation of Contracts-Mutual
Assent." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17-70 (1979).
32. See infra part II.E.

CONSIDERATION

1993]

consideration doctrine can serve as a backup for assent doctrine vary
accordingly. I shall illustrate these variations before assessing the
implications of the redundancy of consideration doctrine.
A.

Complete Failure of Agreement

In some of the cases involving applications of one of the corollaries
to the doctrine of consideration, one is driven to the conclusion that the
parties had no agreement at all. The requirement of mutuality of obligation was invoked in such a situation in Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams.33 The plaintiff lender (Gulf) made a loan
to an individual (Payne) for the purpose of purchasing a car from the
defendant seller (Williams). 34 The check representing the loan was
jointly payable to Payne and Williams. A notice on the back of the
check included the warning: "You are obligated to furnish a negotiable
title to the vehicle .. .within thirty days after endorsement of this
check."35 Although Payne apparently obtained a document of title, the
lender never received it.36 As a result, the lender was unable to perfect a
security interest in the car.37 When Payne defaulted on the loan and
disposed of the car, the lender sued both Payne and Williams on the
theory that both were contractually obligated to deliver title to the
vehicle.38
The trial court entered summary judgment for Williams, and the
appellate court affirmed. 39 The primary ground for the appellate court's
decision was that no "mutual intent" or "distinct understanding common
to both parties" had been demonstrated.40 Williams and the lender had
no communications other than the check itself, and the language of the
check did not identify unambiguously who was to deliver title or to
whom it was to be delivered. 4 As there had been no meeting of the
minds, there was no agreement to enforce.4 2 The court added that the
lender had neither promised anything to Williams nor done anything
specifically for him. It had merely disbursed funds pursuant to an
existing agreement with Payne.4 3 Accordingly, the alleged agreement
33. 693 P.2d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
34. Id. at 1094.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1094-95.
37. Id. at 1094.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1095.
41. Id. On the same factual basis, of course, the court could have held that the agreement
asserted was too indefinite to be enforced.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 1096.
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with Williams also failed for lack of mutuality of obligation." The
application of consideration doctrine may have been correct by classical
45
standards, but it was obviously secondary and utterly superfluous.
In other cases, the "past consideration" corollary to the doctrine of
consideration has been applied where the failure of assent was so complete that the parties literally had no agreement. The best example is
probably Rohrscheib v. Helena HospitalAss'n.46 A woman was admitted to the plaintiff hospital for treatment. Although she was apparently
unaccompanied at the time of admission, her brother-in-law, the defendant Rohrscheib, visited her five days later. 4 7 Rohrscheib became concerned about her condition and arranged for her transfer to a hospital in
Memphis. 41 When his sister-in-law was released, Rohrscheib signed the
admission form that had been typed by a hospital employee when the
sister-in-law was admitted.4 9 The form contained information about the
patient but none about hospital charges or rates.5" While the phrase
"Financial Statement" appeared above the signature line and the phrase
"responsible party" appeared below it, the form contained no language
expressly imposing an obligation upon anyone to pay for services or
room occupancy. 51 Rohrscheib thought that by signing the form he was
merely assuming responsibility for any injury to his sister-in-law that
might occur after her release. 52 The hospital, however, contended that,
by signing the form as the "responsible party," Rohrscheib had guaranteed payment of his sister-in-law's hospital bill, which was in excess of
$4000.53
The hospital prevailed at the trial court level, but the court of
appeals reversed. 54 It examined the admission form and found no evi44. Id. at 1095-96.

45. For additional cases applying the requirement of mutuality under circumstances indicating
a complete absence of assent by one of the parties, see Parmenter v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
925 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1991) (alleged promises of payment to lessors of agricultural land by
FDIC made by one who was not agent of FDIC); Meineke Discount Muffler Shops v. Feldman,
480 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (alleged assignment executed only by purported assignees);

Historic Hermann, Inc. v. Thuli 790 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (person who executed real
estate contract was not agent of plaintiff, and plaintiff took no other action making it a party to the

contract).
46. 670 S.W.2d 812 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984).
47. Id. at 813-14.
48. Id. at 814.

49. Id. at 813-14.
50. Id.
.51. Id.at 814.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The hospital's victory in the lower court was based largely on the strength of parol
evidence that "at some point" Rohrscheib had been informed that he was assuming responsibility
for hospital charges, even though the charges had not been computed at that time. Id. The court
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dence of any promise by Rohrscheib to pay anything and no evidence to
indicate what "responsibilities" a "responsible party" might be assuming."5 The court added that a promise, unsupported by new consideration, to pay the preexisting debt of another "relates to a past
consideration" and is unenforceable.5 6 As Rohrscheib did not sign the
form until after the charges had been incurred, the hospital's claim ran

afoul of the rule on past consideration.57 However, the discussion of
consideration was entirely superfluous and subordinate to the court's
conclusion that there was simply no evidence that Rohrscheib had
agreed to pay. Further examples of such complete failure of agreement
are found in other past consideration cases,58 as well as in cases applying
the rule concerning illusory promises.5
B.

9

Failure to Reach the Final Stages of Assent

Not all cases in which a corollary to the doctrine of consideration
serves as a backup theory for the requirement of assent involve such
complete failures of agreement. Courts sometimes apply the doctrine of
of appeals held this parol evidence inadmissible under the Arkansas Statute of Frauds, which
contains the usual provision requiring promises to answer for the debt of another to be in writing.
Id.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 815 (citations omitted).
57. Id.
58. There are two additional cases that involve an application of the doctrine of past
consideration and in which the failure of assent was so complete as to amount to a complete
failure of agreement. See Weber by Sanft v. Goetzke, 371 N.W.2d 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding alleged joint enterprise among members of extended family to clean up, sell, and divide
proceeds from lakefront recreational property not to be contractual); Remington v. Wren, 564 P.2d
1025 (Ore. 1977) (unsuccessful attempt by contractor to impose "account stated" for more than
original contract amount). See also Deeter v. Dull Corp., 617 A.2d 336 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(refusing to find suretyship contract on the basis of mere "moral obligation"; evidence of promise
or assent by alleged surety entirely lacking).
59. See, e.g., Serpe v. Williams, 776 F. Supp. 1287 (N.D. I11.1991). The dispositive issue in
Serpe was whether the wives of four life insurance salesmen established a contractual relationship
with the husbands' employer simply because the husbands' employment agreements contained
signature lines for the wives. The court first did precisely what the objective theory of assent
would require it to do without referring to assent at all. The court examined the contract and
related materials and noted the paucity of references to the spouses and the absolute absence of
any commitment by any spouse to do anything whatsoever. Further, the court noted the
contrasting detailed elaboration of the duties of the husbands. The court concluded that no one
intended the wives to be parties to the agreement. The signature line for a spouse on each contract
was insufficient, by itself, to manifest the requisite intent.
The court could have ended its opinion at that point, concluding that any reasonable person
would consider each spouse's signature a mere gesture of solidarity rather than a manifestation of
contractual assent. Instead, however, the court found that any promise on the part of the wives
was the illusory promise to "support their husbands only if they want to," which was insufficient
to satisfy the requirement of mutuality. In traditional doctrinal terms, the discussion of
consideration is flawless, but the whole discussion came after the conclusion that the wives had
not really agreed to do anything or become parties and was, therefore, entirely superfluous.
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consideration in cases in which they also find that the parties to an
alleged contract are engaged in mere preliminary negotiations or have
reached partial agreement but fallen short of a final manifestation of
assent. One of the illusory promise cases, Garber v. Harris Trust &
Savings Bank,6" provides an example. The case was a class action
brought by credit card holders against a group of credit card issuers.61
Each of the issuers had announced changes in the terms upon which it
would extend credit, including the addition of annual fees, increases in
minimum monthly payments, and changes in the method of finance
charge computation. 62 The cardholders contended that such changes
constituted unilateral attempts to modify an existing contract and, therefore, amounted to breaches of contract. 63 The premise of the cardholders was that the application for a credit card is an offer that is accepted
when the card issuer issues a credit card to the applicant.' The essential
terms of the contract are outlined in the cardholder agreement in effect at
that time. 65 The cardholders argued that attempts at unilateral modification are ineffective because they violate the preexisting duty rule, in that
they are attempts to secure greater compensation for performing an
existing contractual obligation.66
The court rejected the cardholders' contentions and dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims on a variety of grounds.67 One argument accepted by
the court was that there can be no contract upon the issuance of a credit
card because there is no obligation imposed upon the cardholder.68 The
cardholder incurs no liability unless she uses the card, and she is under
no obligation to use it.69 Given the illusory7" nature of the cardholder's
commitment at that point, the agreement lacks mutuality of obligation
60. 432 N.E.2d 1309 (I11.App. Ct. 1982).

61. Id. at 1310.
62. Id. at 1310-11.
63. Id. at 1310.
64. Id. at 1311.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
Id.

70. The court in Garber did not actually use the term "illusory promise." It rested its decision

on the requirement of "mutuality of obligation." Id. The principle of mutuality of obligation
includes not only the instances in which the notion of an illusory promise is used as a corollary to
the doctrine of consideration but also other types of cases as well. However, the Garber court's

analysis is functionally equivalent to that of the New Jersey Superior Court in an earlier case.
Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). The Novack court

likewise concluded that a credit card agreement was unenforceable because the cardholder was
free to cancel it or not to use it. Id. at 92. The Novack court, however, specifically classified the
supposed contractual relationship as illusory. Id.
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and is unenforceable.7" In the absence of consideration, the issuer may
change the terms upon which it is willing to extend credit.

For purposes of this Article, the most interesting aspect of the
Garber court's discussion of consideration is that it is superfluous. It

was only one of several grounds for the court's decision, and one of the
alternate grounds was a plausible manipulation of doctrines of assent.
Specifically, the court followed earlier decisions classifying the issuance
of a credit card as a standing offer, not as an acceptance concluding a
contract. 72 Acceptance of the issuer's offer occurs when a cardholder
uses the card to buy something, and each charge forms a discrete contract. 73

The application for the card, which the plaintiffs had asserted to

be an offer, was thus relegated to the status of part of the preliminary
negotiations-at most an invitation to make an offer.
Garberthus seems to be a case in which the illusory promise corollary to the doctrine of consideration is unnecessary because assent doc-

trines can do the same work.74 There are similar examples among the
mutuality of obligation cases 75 and the moral consideration cases. 76 One

71. Garber,432 N.E.2d at 1313.
72. Id. at 1312.
73. Id. at 1311-12.
74. See also Dorman v. Cohen, 413 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (holding agreement
unenforceable on alternate theories of lack of mutuality due to illusory promise and simple failure
to agree).
75. See, e.g., Mayer v. King Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding an alleged three-year employment contract unenforceable on a variety of grounds,
including: (1) fact that plaintiff did not have a promise "in the contractual sense," but only an
expectation of a promise; (2) failure to reach final agreement on essential terms, including
commission; and (3) plaintiffs ability to abandon the employment relationship without liability);
see also Crellin Technologies, Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) (alleged
contract fails for lack of mutuality and because both parties regarded agreement as tentative unless
further contingencies occurred); Baiter v. Pan American Bank of Hialeah, 383 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1980) (held alleged loan agreement, in which exact amount of principal, interest rate, time
and method of repayment, and documentation were still in process of negotiation, unenforceable
as merely preliminary negotiations that were lacking in mutuality); Serpa v. Darling, 810 P.2d 778
(Nev. 1991) (real estate options unenforceable because lacking in mutuality and because parties
never finally agreed upon the essential terms); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 259 S.E.2d 1 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1979) (alleged accord and satisfaction fails for lack of sufficient evidence of intent as
well as for lack of mutuality).
76. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1983) (a "moral consideration" case in
which nearly any of the known assent doctrines could have served as an alternate ground of
decision). The case involved a tangled and largely undocumented series of dealings between a
mother and a son between 1966 and the mother's death in 1978. The trail of loans, notes,
refinancings, purchase agreements, payments, and proceeds became so complicated that neither
the court nor counsel could ascertain what mother and son had intended. The mother's executors
contended that the son was liable on one of the notes at issue because he had promised to pay it "if
and when he could." The court concluded that the son was not liable because the only
consideration was mere moral obligation. The court also suggested failure of assent, concluding
that the transactions between mother and son were "casual and informal, based mostly on mutual
trust rather than contract." The court also could have found that the alleged commitment to pay
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qualification should be added, however. Although not essential in order
to reach the correct result, the Garber court's discussion of illusory
promises is useful in one respect. Specifically, the fact that at a particular stage one party is not committed to anything may strengthen the
court's conclusion that the final stage of assent (acceptance) has not
been reached. In the business context, one expects transactions to be
exchanges, and the absence of consideration at a particular phase of a
deal may provide evidence that the deal is not closed. Therefore, even if
it proves appropriate to strip from the doctrine of illusory promises the
gatekeeping function associated with the doctrine of consideration, it
may still be desirable to permit courts to assign it an evidentiary role
subservient to doctrines of assent. In cases like Garber,a court should
be able to consider whether a promise is illusory in determining whether
an agreement has reached the final stages of assent.77
C.

Indefiniteness

A related doctrine of assent, the requirement of certainty or definiteness, is also capable of shouldering some of the load carried by corollaries to the doctrine of consideration. The requirement of definiteness
is the principle that the parties to a contract must have reached an agreement sufficiently extensive and specific for a court to ascertain when a
breach has occurred and to fashion an appropriate remedy. 78 An example of the principle's overlap with consideration doctrine is provided by
79
an illusory promise case, M.J.S. Resources, Inc. v. Circle G Coal Co.
The plaintiff was the general partner in a limited partnership, St. James
Associates. 81 St. James subleased a coal field and entered into an agreethe note did not qualify as a promise under the objective theory of assent or that it was fatally

indefinite.
77. For an attribution of an evidentiary function (as well as cautionary and channeling
functions) to the doctrine of consideration, see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41

COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). The notion of
subservient to contract doctrines other than
interpretation. See, e.g., Torncello v. United
construed so as to avoid making promise of

an illusory promise is also often used in ways
assent-in particular as a vehicle for contract
States, 681 F.2d 756 (CI. Ct. 1982) (contract
one party illusory); Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v.

Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984) (sovereign immunity waived because
contrary result would render contract illusory); Peeters v. Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters
Welfare Fund, 423 N.E.2d 485 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (illusory nature of adoptive father's pre-birth
"contract" with natural mother used to deny adopted child status of "dependent" at birth for

purposes of insurance coverage); Martin v. Prier Brass Mfg., 710 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(insurance contract construed to avoid making commitment of employer illusory); Newman v.
Sablosky, 407 A.2d 448 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (financing contingency in real estate contract not

construed as grant of absolute right to refuse to purchase; to do so would make agreement lack
"mutuality of promises").
78. See U.C.C. § 2-204 (West 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1979).
79. 506 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
80. Id. at 343. The sole purpose of St. James was to provide a tax shelter for high-income
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ment with Circle G for the actual mining of the coal. 8' The agreement
provided for payments to Circle G for each ton of coal mined. It also
specifically provided that St. James would not be obligated to pay for
coal until it had been sold and unless St. James had specifically
requested that the coal be mined. 2 Unfortunately, the agreement was
silent concerning which party was obligated to arrange for the sale of the
coal.83 When it became clear that Circle G could not perform, plaintiff
brought suit.84
The court found the mining agreement unenforceable on grounds of
lack of consideration, specifically lack of mutuality of obligation.85
Mutuality of obligation was lacking because performance depended
upon the "will, wish or pleasure of one of the parties," which made St.
James' promise to pay illusory.8 6 St. James was only required to pay 8if7
someone pre-sold the coal and St. James requested mining services.
Under the terms of the written agreement, however, St. James was under
no obligation either to sell or to make the request.88 Accordingly, St.
James could not enforce the return promise to perform mining
services. 89
However, the discussion of mutuality of obligation and illusory
promises in M.J.S. is redundant. St. James's promise was illusory
because the parties had failed to agree on an essential term. Each party
thought that the other party was obligated to arrange for the marketing of
the coal.9" If coal must be pre-sold to be mined, a mining agreement
that does not specify who is to do the selling is fatally indefinite.9 If
individuals by exploiting the favorable tax treatment the Internal Revenue Service accorded
advance coal royalties at the time. Id. at 342.
81. Id. at 343.
82. Id. at 344. The reason for the twin requirements of prior sale and prior request was that
coal in the region in question cannot be stored outdoors prior to sale. Apparently, exposure to rain
and organic matter causes a chemical reaction which, in turn, ignites the coal. Id. at 345.
83. Id. at 342-43.
84. Id. at 346. Circle G experienced financial difficulties and sold its assets, thereby disabling

itself from performing. Id. at 345-46.
85. Id. at 342, 347.

86. Id. at 347. The court's opinion does not use the word "illusory," but the phrase in the text
is its functional equivalent.
87. Id. at 344, 347.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 348.
90. Id. at 343.
91. See Tuggle v. Wilson, 280 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (real estate contract contingent
upon purchase of land to south and east of subject property both lacking in mutuality and fatally

indefinite where contingency could refer to either of two tracts), rev'd, 282 S.E.2d 110 (Ga.
1981); see also Leseke v. Nutaro, 567 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (alleged settlement
agreement held lacking in mutuality; court fails to note agreement is also indefinite as to critical

contingency).
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neither party performs marketing services, it is impossible for the court
to ascertain who is in breach. Thus, the labor performed by the doctrine
of consideration could have been performed just as easily, and more
directly, by the requirement of definiteness.92
The "past consideration" cases also provide frequent examples in
which the requirement of definiteness is (or could be) a ground of deci-

sion alternate to consideration. Long-term employment relationships, in
particular, seem to be a recurring source of promises held unenforceable
on alternative grounds of "past consideration," failure of assent, or
indefiniteness.93 Typically, the employer, moved by gratitude over the
employee's past performance, makes some vague, positive reassurance
that the employee interprets as a contractual undertaking.94 In many
92. Contracts in which each party reserves an unlimited termination right can likewise be
accommodated by an application of the requirement of definiteness. Occasionally, one party
terminates such a contract after performing for a substantial period of time, and a court denies
recovery to the party bringing suit on the grounds that the termination right renders the plaintiff's
own commitment illusory. The commitment of the other party is, therefore, void for lack of
consideration. See, e.g., Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser, 407 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA
1981) (attempt to recover damages for defendant's breach of agreement to conduct retail gasoline
business on premises of plaintiff's convenience store); Interchange Assoc. v. Interchange, Inc.,
557 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (unsuccessful attempt to obtain specific performance of
management contract containing unlimited resignation right). In such cases, the indefiniteness of
the term of the agreement makes a prospective grant of damages speculative and an award of
specific performance futile. Resort to the doctrine of consideration is therefore unnecessary.
93. Not all of the interesting examples occur in the employment context, however. See, e.g.,
Ponze v. Guirl, 794 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). A woman (Ponze) gave her boyfriend
(Guirl) a total of $14,100 to invest on her behalf in the commodities market. Id. at 700.
Naturally, Guirl lost his shirt, as well as all but about $500 of Ponze's money. Id. Thereafter,
Ponze alleged an oral agreement to the effect that, if Guirl could retain the remainder of Ponze's
funds, he would repay her full investment with interest. Id. In addition, Guirl later signed a letter
in which he "state[d] his intent" to repay $13,100 with interest "as soon as practicable or upon the
sale of his stock in the General Automatic Transfer Company." Id. at 701.
Ultimately, the court held the alleged oral agreement that followed the commodities trading
losses fatally indefinite. Id. at 701-02. Specifically, the duration of the alleged loan was
unspecified, and it was unreasonable to infer that Guirl would agree to pay $14,100 on a $511.99
loan with payment due on demand. Id. at 702. The subsequent "letter of intent" also failed to
qualify as a contract on several grounds. In part, the court applied the objective theory of assent
(without expressly mentioning it) and held the letter did not amount to a promise. By its express
terms, the letter was a mere statement of intention. Id. In addition, the letter was transmitted long
after the alleged loan was made, and thus was not supported by consideration. Id. Obviously, the
result in the case would have been no different if the court had simply omitted its ruling on the
issue of past consideration.
94. See Spickelmier Indus., Inc. v. Passander, 359 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (promise
to pay deferred portion of bonus for past services "when and if sufficient funds were available");
Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co., 438 A.2d 1091 (R.I. 1982) (promise to "take care of" retiring
employee held unenforceable because it was based on past consideration and was not a direct and
definite promise to pay a pension); Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1984) (employee told he would "never have to worry about employment" because of past
satisfactory services; held unenforceable for lack of consideration, mutual assent, and definiteness,
and because statement was mere encouragement).
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such cases, the promises in question are either too indefinite to enforce
or too vague to be construed as a promise. 95 Thus, in a significant

number of cases, the work performed by the doctrine of past consideration can easily be performed by ordinary assent doctrines.
D.

The Objective Theory of Assent

Some of the cases discussed above also illustrate one further assent
doctrine that can make the application of one of the corollaries to the
doctrine of consideration redundant. Specifically, in some of the cases
courts concluded that a reasonable person would classify the communiwhich suit was brought as something other than
cations upon
9
promises. 6 Such straightforward applications of the objective theory of

assent 97 make the doctrine of consideration redundant. If communications do not amount to a commitment at the outset, the question whether
they are "supported by consideration" need not arise.
Cases distinguishing promissory from non-promissory communications, however, exhaust neither the objective theory of assent nor its
potential for supplanting applications of the doctrine of consideration.
There is a class of communications that are clearly promissory in character but are too casual or trivial to be subjects for contractual enforcement.98 The class is somewhat ill-defined, but it traditionally includes

sham promises, jokes, at least some intrafamily promises, and social
promises among friends (such as a promise to meet for lunch).9 9 The
objective theory of assent is sometimes used to deny enforcement to
95. See supra note 94; see also Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 384 A.2d 1228 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978) (promise to pay medical expenses of injured athlete "for all time or such period
of time as the University may determine feasible"; document containing promise expressly
disclaimed legal responsibility for accident and intent to create legal obligation).
96. See Ponze v. Guirl, 794 S.W. 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (past consideration case in which
court also held alleged promise to be mere statement of intention); Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co.,
438 A.2d 1091 (R.I. 1982) (past consideration case in which alleged promise to "take care of"
retiring employee held not to be direct and definite promise to pay pension); Price v. Mercury
Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (past consideration case in which alleged
promises of job security held to be mere statements of encouragement and approval); see also
Parmenter v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 925 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1991) (alleged post-harvest
promises of payment to agricultural land lessors by FDIC held lacking in mutuality of obligation;
"promises" may have been mere predictions of availability of funds); Springfield Television, Inc.
v. Gary, 628 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (past consideration case in which owner's vague
statement that he would "take care of" corporate debt probably did not amount to a promise);
Cardamone v. University of Pittsburgh, 384 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (past consideration
case in which alleged promise to pay medical expenses expressly disclaimed intent to create legal
obligation).
97. See FMARswoRT, supra note 11, § 3.6 (discussing objective theory of assent).
98. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAW

86 (3d. ed. 1986); Morris R.

Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. Rv. 553, 572-73 (1933); Kull, supra note 10, at 40
n.3; Posner supra note 10, at 416-17.
99. See FARNswoRTH. supra note 11, § 3.7 (summarizing types of cases within this class).
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such promises. Such promises, by virtue of their terms or the circumstances surrounding their utterance, indicate to a reasonable person an

intention not to be bound. 1°

It has been suggested, however, that the

doctrine of consideration is also used to mark out this class of promises
and exclude them from the realm of contract.""
An illusory promise case, Universal Computer Systems, Inc. v.
Medical Services Ass'n of Pennsylvania,102 provides an example. Blue

Shield of Pennsylvania solicited bids for a computer lease.103 The solicitation required that bids be received by Blue Shield at its office by noon
of the day specified as a deadline."° Plaintiff Universal prepared a bid
proposal but completed it too close to the deadline for ordinary mail
service.10 5 Universal's president phoned the Blue Shield employee
charged with receiving bids, and the latter promised to pick up Universal's bid at the airport and transport it to Blue Shield's offices before the

noon deadline.106 Universal's president dispatched the proposal to the
appropriate airport via an airline express delivery service.' 07 When he
called the Blue Shield employee to give him the airbill number, how-

ever, the employee informed him that he had changed his mind and
would not pick up the bid.'
As a result, 0 9 the bid did not arrive in
Some add promises involving very low stakes. See Posner, supra note 10, at 417. In my view,
some campaign promises of politicians also belong in this class.
100. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 3.7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21; see
also Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022,
1027-30 (1992) (suggesting that the key to distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable
promises is the manifestation of an intention to be legally bound).
101. Judge Posner, in particular, regards it as part of the function of the doctrine of
consideration to isolate and deny enforcement to such trivial promises. See POSNER, supra note
98, at 86; Posner, supra note 10, at 414-17. Posner recognizes that some promises that the
doctrine of consideration classifies as gratuitous might nevertheless be utility-enhancing
transactions if enforceable. Posner, supra note 10, at 412-14. The enhanced utility of a gratuitous
present transfer is explainable in terms of the phenomenon of interdependent utilities. Id. at 412.
Utility gains would be produced by making at least some gratuitous promises enforceable because
enforcement increases the probability of a future performance and thus increases the anticipated
present value of a series of future transfers. Id. at 412-14. If the common law doctrine of
consideration really invalidated all gratuitous promises, however, Posner's thesis that the common
law is efficient would be threatened. There would be a class of utility-enhancing but
unenforceable promises. Accordingly, he argues (1) that the promises actually invalidated by the
doctrine of consideration are of the trivial kind for which the cost of enforcement is larger than the
gains realizable through enforcement; and (2) that exceptions to the doctrine have been carved out
where gains beyond the cost of enforcement are likely. Id. at 416-25.
102. 474 F. Supp. 472 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
103. Id. at 475.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The causal sequence leading to the untimely delivery of the bid is the stuff of which law
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time to meet the deadline, and, though it would have been the low bid, it

was returned unopened.'
Universal sued Blue Shield for breach of the promise to pick up the
bid, relying on both contract and promissory estoppel theories. A jury
verdict in Universal's favor was set aside by the court, however, primarily on the grounds that the Blue Shield employee lacked authority to
make the promise.II' In addition, the court found that Universal had not
given any consideration for the promise. Since Universal was not bound
to submit a bid at all, its commitment was illusory and would not provide sufficient consideration for Blue Shield's promise to pick up the
2

bid."1

The result in Universal Computer is a bit harsh, and it is possible to
challenge the court's reasoning at a number of points."I3 If the case is
correct at all, it is because the promise of the Blue Shield employee falls
into the class of casual promises too trivial to enforce. Indeed, a proponent of the doctrine of consideration might argue that it is the illusory
character of Universal's return promise that makes Blue Shield's promise to pick up the bid trivial. The absence of consideration, it could be
argued, shows that the Blue Shield employee's promise was made with-

out adequate deliberation" 4 or was merely casual, much like the promprofessors' hypotheticals are made. Universal tried to retrieve its bid from the destination airport
through the use of a local courier service. Id. at 475. Unfortunately for Universal, the airline that
had custody of the package initially refused to release it to anyone except an employee of the
consignor, Universal, or an employee of the consignee, Blue Shield. Id. The former were too
distant to arrive in time, and the latter were unwilling to do so.
110. Id. at 475.
111. The court's finding that the Blue Shield employee lacked authority to make the promise
was based on the premise that such favored treatment would amount to a bid preference in favor
of Universal and would, accordingly, violate applicable federal procurement regulations. Id. at
476-77. The court also concluded that Universal should have been aware of the relevant
regulations. Therefore, Universal's reliance on a promise that would violate them was
unreasonable. Id. at 477-79. The finding of unjustifiable reliance doomed Universal's promissory
estoppel claim.
112. Id. at 477.
113. For example, the relevant federal regulations could have been construed somewhat. less
strictly, so that merely picking up a bid at the airport would not amount to an illegal bid
preference. Such a construction would remove the court's basis for a finding that the Blue Shield
employee lacked authority to make the promise at issue. Indeed, even a ruling that the federal
regulations were ambiguous would presumably have permitted the court to conclude that
Universal's reliance on the promise was reasonable. Such a conclusion would have saved
Universal's promissory estoppel claim, which otherwise seems quite meritorious. But even if the
court's conclusion that the promise in question would violate federal bidding regulations is
correct, it would seem more appropriate to decide the case directly by sustaining a defense of
illegality, rather than taking the circuitous route of agency theory and consideration doctrine.
114. See Fuller, supra note 77 (arguing that the doctrine of consideration helps assure adequate
deliberation). Fuller, of course, regarded the assurance of deliberation as a function of legal
formalities generally and not as a function uniquely performed by consideration doctrine.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:45

ise to do a favor for a friend.' 15
The defender of consideration doctrine might generalize his argument as follows: While there may be some disagreement about the
scope of the class or its exact description, everyone agrees that there is a
class of promises that should not be enforced as contracts.

16

It follows

that contract law needs a gatekeeper doctrine that will exclude the suspect class from the domain of contract. Admittedly, the objective theory
of assent would do the job most directly. The real concern is whether a
reasonable person would consider a particular promise to be "seriously
intended," "sufficiently deliberate," "more than social or casual," or
"made with the intent to affect legal relations.""' 7 Testing directly for
intent or deliberation, however, at least sounds like a messy factual
inquiry, while determining the presence or absence of consideration can
often be adjudicated summarily. Thus, if consideration doctrine really
does pick out the offensive class of promises, it may be a more efficient
way to do so and thus a better gatekeeper.' 8
The flaw in the foregoing argument is that the correlation between
the class of casual promises and the absence of consideration is not
sufficiently high to result in the claimed economy of disposition. On the
one hand, certain promises that lack consideration are serious and deliberate. Large charitable subscriptions are probably the best example. 19
At the opposite end of the spectrum, many of the casual promises that
technically satisfy the doctrine of consideration should be unenforce115. Unfortunately, the court's opinion does not contain a transcript or detailed description of
the conversation in which the Blue Shield employee made the promise. As a result, there is no
direct way for a reader to determine whether the promise was serious or casual or even if the court
had evidence relevant to such a determination before it. Indeed, if the promise had been serious
(and were not tainted by illegality), many contract scholars would probably favor its enforcement,
as the evidence of reliance is unequivocal.
116. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1979); E. Allan
Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An HistoricalIntroduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
576, 591 (1969); C.J. Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54 LAW Q. REV. 233, 244-45
(1938); Harold C. Havighurst, Consideration,Ethics and Administration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
12 (1942); Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration,58 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 942-43
(1958); Samuel Stoljar, Enforcing Benevolent Promises, 12 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 19 (1989); Arthur
T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration:An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72
HARV. L. REV. 1009, 1015-16 (1959); Lord Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to Be
Abolished from the Common Law?, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1228-29 (1936); see also supra notes
98-101.
117. I do not suggest that the quoted phrases are synonymous. They are, however, examples of
ways in which various commentators have tried to describe the class of promises for which
enforcement should be denied. See supra notes 98-101, 116 and accompanying text.
118. Professor Barnett makes a similar suggestion, although he recognizes the limitations of
consideration doctrine as an indicator of intention to be bound. See Barnett, supra note 100, at
1029.
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1979) (recommending the
enforcement of charitable subscriptions without proof of consideration or reliance).
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able. Sham transactions designed to mislead third parties are almost
inevitably cast in the form of bargains, 20 and the same may be true of
mere jokes.' 2 ' Even my social promise to meet a friend for lunch may
22
be conditioned on his promise to meet me and so qualify as a bargain.
Without a close correlation between applications of the doctrine of consideration and membership in the class of casual promises, the doctrine
of consideration cannot be used as a proxy for the objective theory of
assent. If consideration is absent (as in the case of charitable promises),
one must still ask whether the promise in question is "serious" or "deliberate" or accompanied by "legal intent." Conversely, even if consideration is technically present, a promise might still be a sham, a joke, or a
mere social engagement. The appeal to the objective theory of assent
must be made in any event. The attempt to use consideration as a way
of isolating the class of promises too casual 123 to be enforced accomplishes nothing.' 24
E.

The Primacy of Assent

Thus, to the extent that the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration overlap with applications of the objective theory of assent,' 25 the
assent doctrine is clearly primary. As suggested earlier, however, the
corollaries to the doctrine of consideration are often rendered redundant
by other aspects of the general requirement of mutual assent. 26 It is
therefore appropriate to ask whether assent doctrine is similarly primary
in those cases. If some cases in which consideration is lacking are also
120. See, e.g., Ratchford v. United States Cent. Underwriters Agency, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 137

(E.D. Mo. 1980) (guaranties executed to make stock offering more attractive; false recitals of
consideration).
121. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 3.7 (examples of sham and joke cases).
122. See STrroN, supra note 30, at 227; Wright, supra note 116, at 1228. Of course, if I
promise to buy my friend lunch, the requirement that he meet me may be a mere condition

attached to a gift, not a bargain promise. But I am not so altruistic that the majority of my social
promises slide out of the category of bargain into that of gift, and I see no reason to assume that
most social promises are gratuitous rather than reciprocal.
123. If, as Posner suggests, it is our goal to screen out promises or transactions in which
minimal amounts are at stake, some form of jurisdictional amount requirement would appear to be
a more direct and clear-cut means of accomplishing it. See POSNeR, supra note 98, at 86; Posner,
supra note 10, at 416-17. Indeed, Professor Gordon has argued that the law of damages already

screens out claims for trivial injuries. See Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 7, at 995.
124. It might be appropriate in some cases to use the absence of consideration as one relevant
fact tending to support the conclusion that a promise is too casual to be enforced. In a case like
Universal Computer, for example, the fact that a gratuitous promise is made in a business context

(where one normally expects exchanges) may be anomalous enough to have some evidentiary
value. However, the use of the absence of consideration as one evidentiary fact among many is
very different from assigning it a lone and conclusive gatekeeping function appropriate for
summary disposition.
125. See supra part II.D.
126. See supra part II.A-C.
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cases in which agreement is lacking entirely (or lacking in finality or
definiteness), the principle of theoretical economy would suggest that
one of the twin grounds of decision-lack of consideration or failure of
assent-could be eliminated in favor of the other. " ' One might ask,
however, why the consideration corollary rather than the relevant doctrine of assent should be eliminated.
The answer begins with a recognition that the overlap between lack

of consideration and failure of assent is not entirely coincidental. This is
most obvious in the case of illusory promises. A promise equivalent to
"I will if I so desire" is certainly questionable. It was recognized long

ago, however, that the questionable nature of illusory promises is best
1 28
explained by the simple observation that they are not promises at all.
The alleged promisor has made no real commitment and so has not made
anything that would be recognized as a genuine promise. 129 This presumably is why illusory promises do not suffice as consideration. If one
accepts the further premise that both offers and acceptances are normally
promissory, 130 it becomes obvious that cases in which a finding of lack
of consideration is based on the illusory character of one party's promise
will also frequently be cases in which assent is lacking or not final.
Llewellyn generalized the same point more broadly by observing
127. The statement in the text assumes that one regards theoretical simplicity and economy as
a virtue. I have indicated elsewhere that I so regard it. See Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money
Inventory Financing: The Case for Limited Cross-Collateralization,51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1285, 1322
n.258 (1990) (applying the principle of theoretical economy known as "Ockham's razor"). While
there is probably broad agreement that theoretical economy is a desirable goal in legal theory, the
strength of its appeal varies among scholars. Those whose theoretical tastes run to the ornate may
thus not find the mere redundancy of consideration as strong a reason to abandon it as I do. Such
individuals may, however, be more impressed with the argument made in parts III. and IV., infra,
that the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration do positive harm.
128. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 145 (1952).
129. This is perhaps most obvious in cases in which an attempt is made to enforce the illusory
promise itself. Doctrines of assent, rather than consideration, typically play the major role in the
disposition of such cases, because the return promise is often (though not invariably) a real one.
See Rosenberg v. Lawrence, 541 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); People v. Tobler, 397
N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979). Sometimes, courts analyzing illusory promises seem to confuse doctrines
of assent and consideration. See, e.g., In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 29 B.R. 275 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983) (court refuses to enforce trustee's illusory promise to pay rent on ground the
rental arrangement "tenders no consideration recognizable" under applicable law; return
commitment substantial); Felice v. Clausen, 590 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (illusory
promise held not to be an offer and thus unenforceable; court concludes consideration absent in
spite of substantial return promise).
130. Obviously, in stating this generalization I am deliberately ignoring the case of unilateral
contracts in which, by definition, the acceptance takes the form of an action other than a promise.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 30, 32 (1979) The drafters of the Restatement
recognized the possibility of non-promissory offers or acceptances, but they clearly regarded
promissory varieties of both as the more common and prototypical cases. See id. §§ 24 cmt. a, 50
cmt. c.
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that, in analyzing the prototypical executory bilateral contract, the courts
had manipulated the doctrine of consideration to the point where its
overlap with offer and acceptance was virtually automatic. 1 3 1 In most
business contracts there are promises on both sides and, at least at the
outset, neither side has performed. In such business deals, formation
(and so assent) precedes performance. The business person involved in
such a deal considers his "inducement" for entering into it or what he
was "bargaining for" to be the actual performance by the other party.' 3 2
The lay person's conception that lies behind the legal notion of consideration is thus related to actual performance, not the promise of performance. Actual performance, however, cannot be the consideration that
supports a bilateral executory contract, because consideration must be
present at the inception of the agreement. The quite sensible response of
the courts, as Llewellyn observed, was to manipulate the notion of consideration so that the promise that constitutes the offer or acceptance,
though of only minor value to the business person, satisfies the technical
requirement of consideration. 33 In this important class of cases, therefore, offer, acceptance, and consideration will typically coincide.1 34
Not all contracts, of course, fit the model of the simple executory
bilateral, and the correlation between assent and consideration will thus
be only partial. But if, in those cases in which assent doctrines and
consideration doctrine do duplicative work, theoretical economy moves
us to dispense with one of them, Llewellyn's observations provide at
least historical reason to regard assent as primary and consideration as
dispensable. Faced with a potential conflict between consideration and
assent in the executory bilateral agreement, the courts twisted consideration doctrine until it no longer threatened business agreements blessed
by doctrines of assent as well as commercial practice. The fact that
consideration had to yield in favor of assent, however, indicates that, in
practice, assent doctrine is more fundamental.
Indeed, quite apart from Llewellyn's historical analysis, there is
reason to regard assent as more fundamental to contract theory and doc131. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE
L.J. 779, 784, 787 (1939).
132. "[I]n the bilateral situation the first and outstanding fact of life is that outside of lunatic
asylums real people do not in good faith offer 'a promise for a promise."' Id. at 789. While
Llewellyn's insight seems unassailable, its contrary has occasionally been argued. See, e.g.,
James Barr Ames, Note, Two Theories of Consideration: II. Bilateral Contracts, 13 HARV. L.

REV. 29, 31-32 (1899) (arguing that each party to a bilateral executory contract bargains for the
promise of the other quite apart from its legal effect).

133. "[I]n the bilateral situation horse-sense about agreeing has forced such modification of

the orthodox 'detriment' theory of consideration as has proved necessary to make room for
bilateral executory obligation." Llewellyn, supra note 131, at 787.
134. Id.
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trine than consideration. Notions of "agreement" and "promise" are
definitive of contracts viewed as a separate field of law.1 35 Much of the
debate between the "death of contract" theorists and their opponents
reduces to a dispute over the extent to which contract consists of obligations voluntarily assumed by promising as opposed to obligations collectively imposed in a manner analogous to the field of torts. 136 Even those
who regard socially-imposed duties as dominant, however, concede
some role in contract for the intentions of the parties. 137 Indeed, in the
absence of a state-planned economy or industry so vertically integrated
that resources are allocated by executive authority, it is difficult to imagine or describe either the economy or contract without invoking notions
of voluntary agreement.' 38 The doctrines that correlate to these core
139
notions of agreement and promise are the various doctrines of assent,
not the rules grouped under the doctrine of consideration. Thus, in cases
in which consideration and assent do duplicative work and one is to be
eliminated, it is consideration that must go. Assent is not only historically primary; contract as we know it cannot even be conceived without
it. 140 The same is not true of the doctrine of consideration.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (defining the term "contract" in
terms of a promise or set of promises); see also FRIED, supra note 9, at 1-2, 7-14, 17-21, 40-54
(arguing that the "the promise principle" explains the bulk of contract law); Wright, supra note
116, at 1225-26 (observing that the use of consideration as a test of enforceability is a common
law peculiarity and that other legal systems focus more directly on the manifestation of serious,
deliberate intention to create legal relations).
136. See FRIED, supra note 9, at 4-5, 21-27, 57-74; GILMORE, supra note 2; Barnett, supra note
100, at 1023-26; Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts, and the Relational Approach,
1988 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 139; Patrick S. Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1981).
137. See Linzer, supra note 136, at 142; Atiyah, supra note 136, at 515.
138. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 809; Llewellyn, supra note 24, at 782; Llewellyn, supra note
30, at 717.
139. It has been argued, for example, that the very concept of a promise presupposes at least a
rudimentary form of acceptance by the promisee. If a promise is to be distinguished from a threat,
it must be "wanted" or "taken up" by the promisee. See FRIED, supra note 9, at 40-43; Samuel
Stoljar, Promise, Expectation, and Agreement, 47 CAMBRtDGE L.J. 193, 198-200 (1988). At least
a primitive form of the offer/acceptance structure of mutual assent thus seems built into the very
notion of a promise.
140. I am not suggesting that all contract duties are defined in scope by the intentions of the
parties. Even the objective theory of assent is a partial departure from the true intentions of the
parties. Llewellyn realized that many rules of contract law function as background rules that the
parties simply presuppose while they negotiate the few dickered terms of a contract. The parties
do not so much expressly choose the background terms as fail to displace them. See Karl N.
Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
863, 869-70 (1941). More recently, it has become fashionable to refer to such background rules as
"default rules," presumably by analogy to the default drive on a computer, and to contrast them
with both the expressly negotiated terms and the "immutable rules" of contract law that cannot be
displaced by agreement. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling in Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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I.
A.

CONSIDERATION AS A POLICING DEVICE

Considerationas an Alternate Method of Policing Misconduct in
Bargaining

The preceding section focused on cases in which one of the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration was (or could have been) rendered

superfluous by an application of one or more of the doctrines collected
under the rubric of mutual assent. In a substantial number of cases,
however, the corollaries travel in tandem with legal doctrines designed
to police the bargaining process for deception or improper pressure. In
some instances, consideration doctrine is clearly superfluous because the
requirements of a defense such as fraud, duress, or undue influence are
clearly satisfied. In addition, there are a few cases in which the facts
suggest such alternate defenses, but the factual record does not clearly
establish any one of them. In the latter class of cases, the doctrine of
consideration appears to function as a surrogate for such defenses. The
question becomes whether that is a proper function. That question will
be addressed after a few illustrations.
1.

FRAUD AND FRAUD ON CREDITORS

An example of the use of the doctrine of past consideration to avoid
giving effect to a promise arguably procured by deception is provided by
Fourticq v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 4 ' Fourticq owned an inter-

est in an insurance agency that sold insurance for Fireman's Fund.'42
While an owner, Fourticq had personally guaranteed the agency's obligation to remit premiums to Fireman's Fund.' 43 Fourticq sold his ownership interest when the agency was restructured, and Fireman's Fund
signed an agency agreement with a successor agency in which Fourticq
had no ownership interest.'" More than a month later, Fireman's Fund
obtained Fourticq's signature on a guaranty of the successor agency's
obligations under the new agency agreement. 4 5 The guaranty falsely
recited that it was given in return for the execution by Fireman's Fund of
the agency agreement with the successor agency.' 4 6 What Fourticq did
not know and was not told was that Fireman's Fund had given notice of
termination of that agency agreement nearly a month earlier, only one
week after its execution. "17 Fourticq thus guaranteed obligations that
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

679 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 563.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 563-64.
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Fireman's Fund had already made much more difficult or impossible for
the agency to meet. The court had no difficulty invalidating the guar-

anty on the traditional ground that new consideration must support a
guaranty or indemnity agreement executed after the initial extension of
credit to the primary obligor.148 It is likely, however, that the conduct of
Fireman's Fund amounted to fraudulent concealment, 149 and defenses of
mistake, unconscionability, or breach of the duty of good faith might
have been available as well.
Occasionally, a transfer or a promise ostensibly based on past consideration is an indication, not that the promisor has been deceived or
improperly pressured, but that the parties are colluding to defraud creditors. Where a transaction is still executory, of course, the use of the
doctrine of past consideration as a gatekeeper can produce the same
result as fraudulent conveyance law. 150 The Rub brothers of North
Dakota learned this lesson to their chagrin in Production CreditAss'n of

Mandan v. Rub. 5 ' The Production Credit Association (PCA) attempted
to foreclose on a security interest in the livestock and equipment of one
of the brothers, Duane Rub.1 2 The chief obstacle to PCA's success was
a rival six-figure note and a security agreement covering much of the
same collateral executed in favor of Duane's brother Jeffrey and his
wife.' 53 Duane and Jeffrey were evasive when asked what value had
148. Id. at 564-65. 1 shall present an argument in favor of abandoning this traditional rule. See
infra part III.A.4.
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 161(b), 162-164.
150. In one such case, a finding that a transfer lacked consideration was simply a subsidiary
finding of the court necessary to sustain a successful attack on the transfer on the ground that it
was a fraudulent conveyance. Tcherepnin v. Franz, 457 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. 11. 1978). When an
Illinois savings and loan association collapsed and went into federal receivership in 1969, its
receiver filed a tort suit against a Mr. Knight. Years later, the receiver obtained a judgment of
nearly $14 million. In 1970, however, Knight had conveyed some valuable real estate into a trust
for the benefit of four non-profit organizations, including a college and a medical school. When
the federal receiver sought to set aside the conveyance to the trust as fraudulent, both the college
and the medical school argued that they had provided valuable consideration for the transfer. The
college argued that its interest was obtained in exchange for help it had given Knight in a 1954
eminent domain dispute with the federal government. The medical school was equally creative. It
contended its interest in the land trust was acquired in return for free medical services rendered to
Knight for twenty-five years by one Dr. Wood, who in return had asked Knight to endow a chair
at the medical school in his honor. The court concluded that neither the past medical services nor
the past assistance in resisting the federal power of eminent domain amounted to consideration for
the real estate conveyance because neither were bargained for in exchange for the conveyance.
Once it concluded that the transfer was without consideration, the court satisfied itself that the
remaining elements of a fraudulent conveyance were present and ultimately set aside the transfer
of the land. Obviously, even if the doctrine of consideration were deprived of its general
gatekeeping function, its use in favoring equitable distribution among creditors through fraudulent
conveyance law could, and should, continue.
151. 475 N.W.2d 532 (N.D. 1991).
152. Id. at 533.
153. Id. at 533, 535.
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been given in exchange for the note and security agreement.' 54 Duane
could not recall why he had given Jeffrey the security interest and was
unable to recall any cash changing hands.15 5 Apart from "love and
affection," the only candidate for consideration was farm work (of an
unspecified amount and duration) done by Jeffrey, apparently in the
past.' 56 The trial court found the whole transaction fraudulent and the
note and security agreement without consideration. The appellate court
affirmed. 157 PCA prevailed, and again it is clear that the fraud-on-creditors theory alone would have sufficed for the court's purposes. Other
past consideration cases are similar, although in some instances the
58
fraud on creditors is less clear.'
Fourticq and Rub were cases in which the doctrine of "past consideration" could clearly be replaced by a traditional policing defense. In
one mutuality of obligation case, Sorrells v. Bailey Cattle Co.,' 59 the
evidence of fraud is not quite as strong. Mr. and Mrs. Sorrells were two
nice city people who were fleeced by a somewhat more shrewd country
land broker, Mr. Bailey. The Sorrellses first contacted Mr. Bailey at his
real estate brokerage office for the purpose of buying land in a particular
Arkansas county.' 6 ° After the Sorrellses were shown some property,
they entered into two successive agreements with Mr. Bailey's cattle
company, which owned the thirty acres of land the Sorrellses had
selected.' 6 The first was a standard offer and acceptance form. It specified the total price, a $2700 earnest money payment, a ten-year amorti62
zation period for the balance, and approximate monthly payments.'
The Sorrellses, however, were unfamiliar with the methods for giving a
proper legal description of rural land, and the offer and acceptance form
did not contain one.' 63 For reasons that are not clear, the Sorrellses later
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 535-36.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 535-36.
See In re Levine, 23 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (execution of mortgage bond and

mortgage to sister and brother-in-law reflecting series of advances made over preceding seventeen
years), rev'd, 32 B.R. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Abraham v. Abraham, 279 N.W.2d 85 (Neb. 1979)
(assignment of interests in contract for sale of restaurant business prompted by fear of assignor's
potential civil liability arising out of theft). The factual record in such cases is murkier than that in
Tcherepnin and Rub and lends less support for a finding of fraud on creditors. It is therefore
possible that the elimination of the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration would
require greater diligence on the part of litigants in building factual records or, if that proved
impractical, relaxation of the evidentiary standards of proof for fraudulent conveyances or fraud
on creditors.
159. 595 S.W.2d 950 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
160. Id. at 952.
161. Id. at 952-53.
162. Id. at 952.
163. Id.
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executed a second agreement, designated a "Purchaser's Agreement,"
apparently for the same land but also without a legal description or identification.' 64 The purchaser's agreement differed from the offer and
acceptance form in three ways, all favorable to Bailey.165 The most convenient change postponed Bailey's obligation to deliver a deed and an
abstract of title until the purchase price was paid in full some ten years
later.' 66 That provision was particularly advantageous to Mr. Bailey
because, at the time of the sale to the Sorrellses, he was probably unable
to convey marketable title.1 67 This rather inconvenient fact was not disclosed to the Sorrellses at the time of the purported sale to them.' 68 The
Sorrellses were never furnished evidence of Bailey's title, and neither
the offer and acceptance form nor the Purchaser's Agreement was in
recordable form.' 69 The Sorrellses were, therefore, unable to give notice

of their equitable interest in the land.' 70 In fact, they apparently had no
means of access to the land, because Bailey had failed to fulfill an oral
side agreement to build an access road to the Sorrellses' tract across land
of his own. 171 When the Sorrellses fell behind in their payments, they
listed the land for sale, unwisely choosing Mr. Bailey as their real estate
agent. Mr. Bailey apparently made no efforts to find a buyer. 7 ' Ultimately, the Sorrellses filed a suit in equity, seeking rescission of the
whole transaction. 7 3 In a stunning display of judicial error, the local
chancery court refused to order rescission, entered judgment against the
Sorrellses personally, and decreed foreclosure with respect to the
land. 174
The more merciful appellate court reversed.' 75 The court had a
variety of grounds for reversing the decision. 76 One ground was a rul164. Id. at 952-53.
165. Id. at 953.
166. Id. The other two changes were the addition of a provision for the payment of interest

and a reservation to Bailey of one-half the mineral rights in the land. Id.
167. Id. at 957. Bailey had mortgaged the thirty acres in question to a Little Rock bank to
secure a $300,000 loan, and the bank apparently had no obligation to release the thirty acres until
the entire balance of the loan was paid. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 953, 957.
170. Id. at 957.
171. Id. at 953, 958.
172. Id. at 953.
173. Id. at 951.
174. Id. at 952-54.
175. Id. at 959.
176. Specifically, the absence of any document containing a legal description of the land made
the agreement run afoul of both the Statute of Frauds and the requirement of definiteness. Id. at
954-56. Bailey's failure to build an access road, furnish a survey, and provide an abstract of title
(or title insurance) amounted to substantial breaches of the initial agreement, thus excusing the
Sorrells. Id. at 958-59.
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ing that the second agreement deprived the buyers of benefits with no
corresponding change in the seller's rights or duties. Thus, it failed for
"lack of mutuality of consideration."' 7
There are two interesting aspects of Sorrells for purposes of this
Article. First, it is yet another case in which the discussion of mutuality
is superfluous. The court could have based its decision on the Statute of
Frauds and the requirement of definiteness, both of which were discussed. More importantly, Sorrells is a particularly good illustration of
the way in which courts use the technical requirements of the doctrine of
consideration as a covert way of policing transactions for unfairness or
misconduct. It is impossible to read the facts of Sorrells and avoid the
feeling that the Sorrellses were cheated. The terms of the deal were
unusually advantageous to the seller, and, even apart from Mr. Bailey's
failure to disclose important information, one suspects that he was not
always a model of candor. Yet, there apparently was nothing in the
record which amounted to an actual fraudulent misrepresentation. While
the deal may have been sufficiently one-sided to qualify as substantively
unconscionable, there was apparently no evidence of the deception,
overreaching, or exploitation of dramatically superior bargaining power
that is more characteristic of cases in which agreements are invalidated
on grounds of unconscionability.'l It may be that the availability of
mutuality and other technical grounds for invalidating the agreement
simply channeled the development of the factual record. If it is unnecessary to prove fraud or unconscionability, litigants may shy away from
the messy factual issues upon which those defenses often depend. There
is the somewhat more disturbing possibility, however, that the Sorrellses
were so ripe for the plucking that Bailey did not need to do anything
fraudulent or unconscionable to take advantage of them. If so, a
defender of the doctrine of consideration might argue that it has been
used, along with other technical defenses, to reach what is arguably the
fair result without the necessity of resorting to defenses which are more
difficult to prove under current standards.' 79 I shall address this argu177. Id. at 956-57.
178. See I JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 197-232 (3d
ed. 1988) (discussing the distinction between substantive and procedural unconscionability).
179. A similar use of consideration doctrines as a covert way of policing a transaction for
deception occurred in a somewhat curious case, Boise Cascade Corp. v. First Sec. Bank of
Anaconda, 600 P.2d 173 (Mont. 1979). A dealer in modular homes, Mountain Sales, Inc., sold a
modular house to a group of real estate developers. The house had been manufactured by Boise
Cascade, and work on it had been completed before the sale took place. The funds for the
purchase were to be provided by the developers' bank, the First Security Bank of Anaconda.
Somehow, the dealer (Mountain Sales) persuaded the developers and the bank to execute two
separate documents, both characterized as "assignments of funds." Each document recited
(falsely) that the assignment of funds was given as an inducement to start production of the
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ment following an analysis of similar pattens in duress and undue influence cases.
2.

DURESS

Applications of the corollary concerning past consideration include
cases in which the promise supported only by past consideration was
extracted by threats amounting to duress. In some cases, the most primitive form of duress, the threat of physical violence, is established.
Quazzo v. Quazzo' 80 was a tale of the tangled dealings between a husband, Ugo, his wife, Jacqueline, and his sister, Ada. 8 ' Between 1962
and 1969, Ugo and Jacqueline spent about $100,000 renovating their
house. 18 2 Ada claimed that she was the source of the funds. 8 3 In 1969,
Ugo and Jacqueline executed a note and mortgage in the amount of

$100,000 in Ada's favor.' 84 The mortgage was not recorded until 1972,
modular home. One document, however, assigned $26,000 (the total purchase price) to Mountain
Sales (the dealer) and its bank, as joint payees, while the other document assigned the same
amount to Mountain Sales and Boise Cascade as joint payees. The purchasers and the bank thus
incurred inconsistent disbursement obligations with respect to a single loan. Mountain Sales
obtained one developer's signature on both documents, apparently by telling him they were just
"necessary for the files." While the court's opinion gives no description of similar conversations
between the bank and Mountain Sales, it appears that the two documents were presented to the
bank for signature four months apart. The bank eventually paid the loan proceeds to Mountain
Sales. Mountain Sales did not, however, pay Boise Cascade for the modular house, and, shortly
thereafter, Mountain Sales became insolvent. Boise Cascade then sued the bank on the second of
the assignments of funds.
The trial held that the second assignment failed for "lack of consideration and lack of
mutuality," and the appellate court affirmed. The construction for which the assignment was
allegedly an inducement had been completed long before the assignment was executed, and Boise
Cascade neither did anything for the bank nor promised anything to the bank. Indeed, there were
not even any communications between the bank and Boise Cascade. The court concluded that the
bank's promise to segregate and disburse the loan funds was gratuitous and unenforceable. The
court's conclusion that the promise in favor of Boise Cascade was gratuitous seems unassailable.
However, it is at least arguable that a written commitment by a bank to segregate and disburse
funds in a particular manner ought to be enforceable regardless of the presence or absence of
consideration. Certainly, such a commitment is the sort of promise that would tend to generate
reliance in the commercial world. Cf. Miles Homes Div. of Insilco Corp. v. First State Bank of
Joplin, 782 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (gratuitous promise by first priority lender to give
notification of delinquency or foreclosure to second priority lender held enforceable on theory of
promissory estoppel). Yet the result in Boise Cascade has a certain intuitive appeal, probably
because it is difficult to imagine why a bank officer would do something as stupid as executing
both of the assignments at issue unless he was deceived or subjected to improper pressure.
Consideration doctrine thus seems to have derailed an unfair deal when more traditional defenses
may not have been provable.
180. 386 A.2d 638 (Vt. 1978).
181. Id. at 639.
182. Id. at 640.
183. Id. The advisory jury refused to believe her.
184. Id. at 639-40.
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when the marriage between Ugo and Jacqueline terminated.' 8 5 Ada
sought to foreclose the mortgage at that time but was unsuccessful for
two reasons. 186 First, the court noted that the note and mortgage were
executed long after the expenditures in question were made and consequently were not part of a bargained exchange. 187 The note and mortgage thus failed for lack of consideration.' 8 8 In addition, there was
evidence that Jacqueline only executed the note and mortgage because
Ugo threatened to drop her out the window, smash her face, or terminate
the marriage.' 89 Accordingly, the trial court found (and the appellate
court affirmed) that the note and mortgage were executed under
duress.' 90 Consideration doctrine and the defense of duress were thus
used in tandem.
Similar parallel uses of duress and past consideration doctrines can
be found in cases in which the form of duress is economic rather than
physical. Tindall v. Konitz Contracting,Inc.'1 provides an illustration.
Tindall was a general contractor, specializing in gravel crushing for
roadways and runways. 92 Tindall wanted to retire, and Konitz, an
19 3
employee of another contractor, agreed to buy Tindall's business.
The two executed separate agreements with respect to the business real
estate and equipment. 1'" Both men realized that Konitz could only be
successful in taking over the business if Tindall assisted him initially, at
least by placing his bonding capacity at Konitz's disposal. 195 The sale
price of some of Tindall's equipment was inflated above market value to
96
compensate for this assistance.
Nearly two years after the initial agreements, Tindall presented
Konitz with a personal services contract, reciting Tindall's performance
of services on various construction projects and obligating Konitz to pay
Tindall $138,629.80.'9' Konitz understandably resisted executing the
contract. Tindall began a series of threats to put Konitz out of business
by contacting Konitz's suppliers, bankers, and bonding companies and
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 642.
Id.
Id.at 641.
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id.

191. 783 P.2d 1376 (Mont. 1989).
192. Id. at 1378.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1380. Initially, Konitz prepared bids for Tindall's signature, although Konitz
actually performed the work. Later, Tindall and Konitz bid as a joint venture. Ultimately, Konitz
was able to bid and perform contracts in his own name. Id. at 1378.
197. Id. at 1378.
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by repossessing Konitz's equipment.198 Konitz's business was not
healthy enough at the time to sustain an economic or legal battle, and he
was forced to sign the personal services contract.' 99 When Konitz's
financial situation improved, he refused to make payments under the
personal services contract, and Tindall retaliated by trying to carry out
the threats he had made. 2" He also filed an action on the personal services contract. 2°t
The trial court found the personal services contract void for lack of
consideration and, in the alternative, unenforceable because it was executed under duress.202 The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed, on the
grounds that past consideration was not sufficient to support the alleged
contract. 20 3 The supreme court could just as easily have chosen the
duress issue as the dispositive one.
When the level of misconduct is as high as it was in Tindall and
Quazzo, duress is a sufficient ground for refusing to enforce a promise. 2° The defense of "past consideration" not only adds nothing but
2no
"pat
204
defn
Te
beside the
point.205
seems entirely
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at. 1379.
202. Id. at 1377.
203. Id. at 1379-80.
204. In some cases, however, the evidence of improper pressure is somewhat sketchy. See,
e.g., Newman v. Sablosky, 407 A.2d 448 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (apparent wrongful threat to abort
real estate closing induces seller of medical practice to execute any covenant not to compete buyer
desires). It may be that the availability of a past consideration defense in Newman prevented the
full development of a factual record or a full judicial description of the record on issues of duress,
good faith, or unconscionability.
205. Cf. McLain v. Heard, 291 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (moral consideration case).
The McLain case was the classic battle between creditor and widow. Shortly after her husband's
death, Mrs. Heard sent Mr. McLain an unsolicited letter in which she stated that her husband's
debt to McLain would be paid, although she could not say when. The letter prompted a series of
statements and bills from McLain, some apparently threatening legal action. Mrs. Heard wrote
McLain again, acknowledging an obligation to pay as well as his right to commence legal
proceedings, but informing him that she would have no money until her home was sold. She
included a $200 payment, which she represented to be all the money she had. McLain filed suit
about a year and a half later, relying on the dead husband's original note and the first letter as
proof of Mrs. Heard's obligation.
The trial court held that there was no contract between Mrs. Heard and McLain, apparently
on grounds of indefiniteness. Mrs. Heard's letters never actually stated the amount of the debt and
did not specify a rate of interest or a time for payment. The court of appeals affirmed, shifting the
rationale to lack of consideration. Mrs. Heard did not extract, as a condition of her promise, a
release of McLain's claim against her husband's estate. Therefore, the transaction was not a
bargain. The respect Mrs. Heard felt for her deceased husband and his intentions was mere moral
consideration and insufficient.
The court of appeals decision disposes of the case neatly, but it is not materially better than
the trial court's rationale. The promise in the first letter is indeed indefinite. The promise in the
second letter could conceivably be construed as a promise to pay out of a definite fund (the house
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In other cases, however, the evidence of duress is very weak, and
the rule that past consideration is insufficient seems to pull the laboring
oar. Moorcroft State Bank v. Morel"° is such a case. Morel was a
rancher and the employer of a couple, Mr. and Mrs. Spain. When the
Spains decided to raise livestock of their own, Morel agreed to furnish
grass for their animals.2"7 The Spains borrowed $9000 from the plaintiff
bank to finance the operation and executed a note and livestock mortgage in favor of the bank in that amount.2 °8 Morel was not involved in
any manner in negotiating the loan with the bank, and the bank did not
rely on him in extending credit to the Spains. 2°9 Eight days later, the
president of the bank invited Morel to his home, where he presented
to Spains. ~~210Moe
Morel with a proposed guaranty of the loan to the
Morel initially refused, explaining that he had only agreed to provide grass for the
livestock, not to guarantee a loan. 211 The bank president insisted that
"I've got to have... I must have this document," and, after "considerable discussion and urging," Morel "succumbed to his argument" and
signed the guaranty.212 After the Spains defaulted and the bank obtained
default judgments against them, the bank sought recovery from
Morel.21 3 Judgment for Morel was affirmed under the traditional rule
that a guaranty executed after an initial credit transaction must be supported by new consideration.21 4 Since the earlier loan to the Spains
could not be consideration for the guaranty, the guaranty failed for lack
of consideration.21 5
The Morel case appears to offer some comfort to the defenders of
the doctrine2 1of
consideration. If the disposition of the case intuitively
"feels" just, 6 it is probably because it is difficult to imagine why Morel
"succumbed" and signed the loan guaranty, unless the president of the
bank either deceived him or applied some form of improper pressure.
The court's opinion, however, does not contain the kind of facts that
would support a finding of fraud, duress, or undue influence. Thus, it is
proceeds), but the opinion suggests that the second letter was prompted by Mr. McLain's
persistent nagging. Since hounding impoverished widows is still considered bad form in most
circles, it is likely a more fully developed factual record would have provided a defense of
unconscionable conduct or even duress to the second promise.
206. 701 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1985).
207. Id. at 1161.
208. Id. at 1160.
209. Id. at 1160-61.
210. Id. at 1161.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1161-62.
216. See infra part III.A.4. I shall argue, infra, that any such intuitive "feeling" is misguided.
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arguable that in Morel, the doctrine of past consideration provided a
convenient way of disposing of a suspect transaction when traditional
contract defenses based on promisee misbehavior were not provable.
3.

UNDUE INFLUENCE

The aged, the infirm, and the aggrieved feature prominently in
some of the past consideration and moral consideration cases. As
promisors, they are susceptible to a variety of pressures that could serve
as the basis for the defense of undue influence. One moral consideration
case in which an undue influence defense was clearly viable was Estate
of Voight.2 17 The case involved a claim against Mr. Voight's estate
based on two notes, each in the amount of $13,500, executed in favor of
his stepsons, Jack and Thomas Kapsa.3' The notes were executed while
Mr. Voight was visiting Jack in Chicago. 2 9 At the time of the visit, Mr.
Voight was an alcoholic in a deteriorated physical condition. 220 He was
less than four months from his own death, and his wife had died six
months earlier. 22 ' He was not represented by counsel, although Jack had
enlisted his own attorney to draft the notes.222 Apparently, Jack asked
Mr. Voight to sign the notes because Jack's mother, Mrs. Voight, had
died owing Jack and Thomas money.223 Mr. and Mrs. Voight, however,
had kept their property, finances, and records sufficiently separated that
Mr. Voight had no legal obligation to pay her separate debts.2 24
The trial court denied the claims on the notes on alternative
grounds of lack of consideration and execution as a result of undue
influence. 225 The appellate court affirmed on the grounds that the notes
were supported only by Mr. Voight's sense of moral duty, which was
insufficient consideration.226 Clearly, the undue influence defense was
also supported by the record and would have sufficed to invalidate the
promises represented by the notes. Thus, the moral consideration cases
illustrate, as did the cases decided under some of the other corollaries to
the doctrine of consideration, that an absence of consideration can be
one factor that indicates promisee misconduct in procuring a promise.
In such cases, however, the misconduct itself frequently provides a
217. 624 P.2d 1022 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

218. Id. at 1023.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1023-24, 1025.

225. Id. at 1023.
226. Id. at 1023, 1025.
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227
defense, and a separate "rule" on moral consideration is unnecessary.
In some of the past consideration cases, however, the misconduct
by the party who benefits from a promise is neither as severe nor as
obvious. In such cases the simplicity of the past consideration defense
makes it at least superficially attractive. Cases involving promises made
by the elderly are particularly difficult, especially if the promisor has
died or become incompetent by the time of trial. Estate of Mariotte22 8 is
a good example of such a difficult case. Helen Mariotte and Virginia
Sigler were close friends for more than thirty years. 229 Between 1949
and 1977, they both lived in Mariotte's house and shared food
expenses. 230 Until 1977, Sigler paid rent. 231 Upon Mariotte's return
home from a hospital stay in 1976, her son and daughter-in-law hired
another woman, Florence Zimmerman, to care for her.232 Unlike Sigler,
Zimmerman received compensation for her services in the form of room,
board, and $85 per week.233 Sigler continued to live in the house and
helped care for Mariotte without compensation.234 She also continued to
pay rent and buy food until December of 1977.235 Sigler then demanded
compensation from Mariotte's son and daughter-in-law for her assistance in caring for Mariotte. 236 The son and daughter-in-law refused to
pay Sigler a salary but did agree to absorb her costs for food and discontinue her rent obligation. 237 This arrangement continued until mid-1979,
when Sigler drafted a document for Mariotte's signature. 238 The document instructed "whoever is in charge of my estate" to pay Sigler at the
rate of $85 a week, plus room and board, retroactive to August 1, 1976,
and to give Sigler's claim priority over other claims.23 9 Mariotte executed the document with an "X," and two other women, who later testified Mariotte was lucid when she signed, witnessed the signature.24 °
Mariotte's daughter-in-law and Sigler filed rival petitions for appoint227. See also Rose v. Howard, 670 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (promise to assign
unenforceable because supported only by "love and affection"; lower court had also sustained
defenses of fraud, undue influence, and mistake).
228. 619 P.2d 1068 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).

229. Id. at 1068.
230. Id.
231. Id.

232. Id. at 1069.
233. Id.
234. Id.

235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

239. Id.
240. Id.
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ment as Mariotte's guardian and conservator shortly thereafter. 241 The
court heard medical testimony that Mariotte was senile, suffered from
Parkinson's disease, and was mentally unable to manage her affairs.2 4 2
When the court granted the daughter-in-law's petition, Sigler filed a
claim for compensation based on the document signed by Mariotte.2 43
Denial of the claim was affirmed, based in part on the rule that "past
benefits do not constitute sufficient consideration. 2 44 Since all services
rendered prior to December 1977 were intended, at the time, to be gratuitous, the subsequent promise to pay for services rendered between
August 1976 and December 1977 was not supported by consideration.2 45
The Mariotte case looks very much like a classic case of undue
influence.2 4 6 It certainly appears that Sigler took advantage of a longstanding, confidential relationship in order to impose a disadvantageous
deal upon a weakened and dependent friend. If the court had not had
available the doctrine of past consideration, it could have reached the
same result-on the same factual record-by sustaining the defense of
undue influence. However, the substitution of undue influence for the
doctrine of past consideration might not be costless in all cases. While
the issue of past consideration can sometimes be decided by a court
summarily, or upon minimal evidence, the issue of undue influence may
not be so easily decided. In Mariotte, for example, while it may have
been clear that Mariotte was losing her grip on reality at the time she
executed the critical document, there were at least two disinterested witnesses who were prepared to testify that she had not yet lost her capacity
to understand what she was doing. 247 Establishing undue influence
would thus appear to require the resolution of factual and credibility
issues. While those factual issues do not appear to have lengthened the
factual record in Mariotte, it is possible they might marginally increase
the complexity of some cases.

4.

THE DANGER:

DECISIONS IN DISGUISE AND UNDERENFORCEMENT

The cases in which an application of one of the corollaries of the
doctrine of consideration is coupled with facts suggesting promisee misconduct seem to present similar patterns regardless of the type of misconduct at issue. At one pole are cases in which the evidence of
misconduct is clear and the use of consideration doctrine is obviously
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. Id. at 1070.
246. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 177 (1979).

247. See Mariotte, 619 P.2d at 1069.
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redundant. At the other pole are cases in which the evidence of misconduct is weaker or more difficult to adduce and in which one suspects that
judges are using consideration doctrine as a convenient way of invalidating transactions that appear suspicious without imposing the traditional
evidentiary burden associated with the misconduct defenses. Defenders
of the doctrine of consideration might248
argue that such shortcutting procost.
or
effort,
time,
in
duces savings
The existence and size of any such economies are necessarily speculative.249 Moreover, against them must be weighed the time and effort
that courts and parties now waste on the intricacies of the doctrine of
consideration.250 More importantly, any savings in time or effort produced by shortcutting come at the expense of the familiar and more serious vices of "dressing decisions in disguise."'25' First, according to one
scholar, judicial decisions based on reasons other than those stated
threaten the predictability that law is supposed to foster. "Cases which
look the same in terms of the factors discussed in past judgments can be
foreseen as likely to incur discrepant treatment only if it is recognized
2 52
that there was more to the past decisions than was discussed openly.
The loss of predictability with respect to applications of the doctrine of
consideration is particularly significant. Predictability of application is
an absolute prerequisite if the doctrine is to fulfill the "channeling" function that its defenders have traditionally touted as one of its principal
justifications.253
Second, public justifications at odds with the real grounds of decision may make a sensible decision appear arbitrary and unfair to both
248. Alternatively, the defenders of the doctrine of consideration might argue that disposing of
cases on questions of law instead of questions of fact enhances the predictability of law and that
the existence of consideration is more frequently resolved as an issue of law than the presence of a

misconduct-based defense. Even if one accepts the debatable premise that the disposition of
questions of law is generally more predictable than the resolution of questions of fact, the answer
to the argument is that the doctrine of consideration in particular is woefully unpredictable in its
application, both because of its complexity and because it is used as a disguise for decisions based
on other reasons. See infra notes 251-59, 380-462 and accompanying text.
249. In particular, the existence of such economies presumes that litigants able to obtain

evidence of misconduct will refrain from doing so if there appears to be an easier way to win a
case. It is not clear, however, that the availability of a defense based on consideration doctrine
will channel the efforts of the parties away from development of evidence of misconduct in any
significant number of cases. I have been told by an experienced (and, at the time, agitated)
litigator, "You don't win cases on the law. You win them on the facts." The implication of such
an attitude is clear: If there is any way to obtain evidence that the opposing party has misbehaved
in any way, obtain it and find a way to use it, no matter how strong your case is on issues of law.
250. See Sharp, supra note 11, at 795.
251. Reiter, supra note 17, at 445.
252. Id. at 446.
253. The classic statement of the "channeling function" of legal formalities is in Fuller, supra
note 77, at 801-03.
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professional and lay critics by substituting a controversial ground of
decision for a more acceptable one.254 Applying a corollary to the doctrine of consideration as a covert way of policing for misconduct may
truncate the court's description of the misconduct in question and
thereby obscure the propriety of the disposition of a case. In the cases in
which a faint odor of misconduct accompanies an application of the doctrine of consideration, there is no way to tell whether stronger evidence
of misconduct was simply absent or not described by the court.
Third, using consideration doctrine as a proxy for misconduct
threatens to stunt the growth of the doctrines establishing and constituting the misconduct defenses.255 Reiter's observation that, in cases
involving unfair bargaining pressure, "we have practical assistance
mainly in cases which can be handled with a broadaxe and only rarely in
those requiring a scalpel" is still largely true. 256 This is harmful because
well-articulated defenses of duress, deception, and undue influence are
necessary even in cases in which consideration is clearly present. In
Sorrells, for example, the apparent victims of misconduct made two
imprudent agreements with respect to a tract of land.25 7 The require-

ment of mutuality could only relieve them from the second. 8
Fourth, where the stated ground of a particular decision and the true
ground of decision do not coincide, there is a danger that, in future
cases, a decision-maker will not be able to "see through the disguise. 259
If the correlation between the stated ground and true ground proves to be
less than perfect in practice, a subsequent court faced with the presence
of the stated ground may feel compelled to follow precedent when the
it is argutrue ground is absent and the disposition undesirable. Indeed,
26 °
able that precisely that phenomenon occurred in Morel.
Morel is one of a number of cases denying effect to a guaranty
made or executed subsequent to a loan or extension of credit.26 ' Some
254. Reiter, supra note 17, at 444, 446.

255. Id. at 446.
256. Id.
257. Sorrells v. Bailey Cattle Co., 595 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).

258. Fortunately for the victims, the villain ran afoul of the Statute of Frauds in both instances.

Id. Similar ineptitude cannot be guaranteed in many cases.
259. Reiter, supra note 17, at 446.
260. Moorcraft State Bank v. Morel, 701 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1985) (consideration lacking for
loan guaranty by debtor's employer executed eight days after loan made).
261. Kafka v. Bellevue Corp., 999 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir. 1993); In Re Adams Lab., Inc., 3 B.R.

503 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); Management Recruiters of Atlanta North, Inc. v. J & B Smith Co.,
362 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Zagoria v. Dubose Enter., 296 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982); McLain v. Heard, 291 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); City Nat'l Bank of Hoopeston v.
Russell, 615 N.E.2d 1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); H. Watson Dev. Co. v. Bank & Trust Co. of
Arlington Heights, 374 N.E.2d 767 (111.App. Ct. 1978); Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v.
Lewark, 503 N.E.2d 415 (Ind.Ct. App. 1987); Taylor's Auto Parts v. Mayo, 807 S.W.2d 215 (Mo.
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of them seem intuitively satisfactory. I suggest, however, that such intuitions are explained not by any intuitive appeal of the principle that "past
consideration is no consideration" but by a mental picture conjured up
by the identity of the subsequent guarantors in many of the cases. Specifically, many of the subsequent guarantors turn out to be individual
principals of a business 262 or relatives of the original obligor.2 63 Subsequent guaranties by such individuals raise peculiar difficulties. These
difficulties may be illustrated by the following hypothetical.
Suppose Sherlock Holmes incorporates the Baker Street Detective
Agency and obtains a start-up loan from LeStrade the Lender to finance
the acquisition of laboratory equipment and other tools of the trade.

LeStrade makes an unsecured loan to Baker Street, the terms of which
require periodic payments. Six months later, Baker Street is current in
its payments, but the general business climate is shaky and Baker
Street's revenues are not meeting expectations. LeStrade is nervous and
seeks security. First, he obtains a personal guaranty of the Baker Street

loan from Sherlock Holmes. Second, LeStrade obtains similar guaranties from Sherlock's brother, Mycroft Holmes, and his dear friend, Dr.
Watson, neither of whom has any ownership interest in Baker Street.
Third, LeStrade obtains a security interest in Baker Street's lab equipment. Fourth, LeStrade requests a special payment to reduce the loan
balance, which he receives in the form of a Baker Street check.
If past consideration is no consideration, the guaranties from SherCt. App. 1991); Springfield Television, Inc. v. Gary, 628 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Martin
Roofing, Inc. v. Goldstein, 457 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1983); Tender Loving Care Agency v. Hladun,
488 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Carolina Eastern, Inc. v. Benson Agri Supply, Inc., 310
S.E.2d 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Fourticq v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984).
262. Ratchford v. United States Cent. Underwriters Agency, 492 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Mo.
1980); Management Recruiters of Atlanta North, Inc. v. J & B Smith Co., 362 S.E.2d 462 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987); Zagoria v. Dubose Enterprises, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Soukop
v. Snyder, 709 P.2d 109 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 532 N.E.2d 935 (Iil.
App. Ct. 1988); Am. Nat'l Bank of Champaign v. Warner, 468 N.E.2d 184 (Iii. App. Ct. 1984);
State ex rel. Ludwick v. Bryant, 697 P.2d 859 (Kan. 1985); Taylor's Auto Parts v. Mayo, 807
S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Missouri Farmers Ass'n v. Wolfe Bros. Farm, Inc., 681 S.W.2d
15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Springfield Television, Inc. v. Gary, 628 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Martin Roofing, Inc. v. Goldstein, 457 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1983); Carolina Eastern, Inc. v.
Benson Agri Supply, Inc., 310 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Farmers Union Oil Co. v.
Maixner, 376 N. W. 2d 43 (N.D. 1985); see also Fourticq v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d
562 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (former owner of business).
263. In Re Adams Lab., Inc., 3 B.R. 503 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); McLain v. Heard, 291 S.E.2d
781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Jackson v. First Bank of Clayton County, 256 S.E.2d 923 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979); City Nat'l Bank of Hoopeston v. Russell, 615 N.E.2d 1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); H. Watson
Dev. Co., Inc. v. Bank & Trust Co. of Arlington Heights, 374 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978);
Missouri Farmers Ass'n v. Wolfe Bros. Farm, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. App. 1984); Fafoutis v.
Lyons, 540 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Tender Loving Care Agency v. Hladun, 488
N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
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lock and Mycroft Holmes and Dr. Watson are all unenforceable. The
original loan is mere past consideration, and, if Baker Street is not in
default, LeStrade has no current rights against the agency, forbearance
from which might constitute present consideration. 264 Does this result
make sense?
There is an argument that it does. The Holmes brothers and Watson are Victorian Englishmen and may be supposed to be rational economic actors. Executing a guaranty in favor of Baker Street is the
assumption of a risk, and rational economic actors would be expected to
exact a price before doing so. Since our heroes did not, we become
concerned. In Sherlock's case, we fear improper pressure. Sherlock's
self-image is intimately connected with his business, and he knows that
LeStrade can make his life difficult even if LeStrade has no present right
of action. We therefore suspect Sherlock may have capitulated to actual
or implied threats.
In the case of Mycroft and Dr. Watson, we fear that the risk
assumed has been undervalued, either because they became careless due
to affection for Sherlock or because Sherlock has deceived or improperly pressured them. However, we cannot prove any of this. Sherlock is
afraid to testify against LeStrade, and Mycroft and Watson are too loyal
to testify against Sherlock. In short, we fear misconduct, but we cannot
obtain the evidence needed to prove it. As a result, we are content to
invalidate the guaranties on the basis of consideration doctrine.
This illustration explains the intuitive sense of satisfaction some
may feel upon an initial examination of the subsequent guaranty cases.
As a rationale for the past consideration corollary to the doctrine of consideration, however, it is inadequate. Its acceptance would introduce
considerable incoherence into commercial law and practice for several
reasons. First, the forms of carelessness or misconduct that generate
concern could have been practiced at the time of the original loan. Had
the guaranties been executed contemporaneously with the Baker Street
loan, however, they would all have been enforceable26 5 unless Sherlock,
Mycroft and Watson were able and willing to prove a traditional misconduct defense. No reason in theory or commercial practice can be
given for treating subsequent guaranties differently.266
264. See Town & Country Bank of Quincy v. E & D Bancshares, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 637 (II1.

App. Ct. 1988); Thornton v. Ankeny State Bank, 453 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
265. The extension of credit to Baker Street would constitute consideration for any number of

contemporaneous guaranties. See Jackson v. First Bank of Clayton County, 256 S.E.2d 923 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1979); Soukop v. Snyder, 709 P.2d 109 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985); Aurora Nat'l Bank v.
Martin, 532 N.E.2d 935 (I!1. App. Ct. 1988); Am. Nat'l Bank of Champaign v. Warner, 468
N.E.2d 184 (Iii. App. Ct. 1984).

266. Two objections might be made to the statement in the text. First, one might object that
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Second, the urge to use the doctrine of past consideration as a
device for policing misconduct covertly diminishes or disappears if we
suppose that the subsequent guaranty is made, not by Sherlock Holmes
or his friends or relatives, but by his landlady, Mrs. Hudson. Her rela-

tionship to Sherlock is purely commercial. If she signs a subsequent
guaranty of Baker Street's obligations, it is probably because she is
looking at the matter "relationally" and sees some long-term value to her
in building good will between her tenant and LeStrade.26 7

Finally, if the subsequent guaranties are invalidated, the treatment
of them is utterly inconsistent with the treatment of the security interest
and the negotiable instrument. By statute, the antecedent debt of Baker
Street qualifies as "value" for purposes of validating the security interest
in Baker Street's laboratory equipment 26 and the negotiable instrument
post-loan guaranties should be treated differently from guaranties contemporaneous with a loan
because the latter, unlike the former, are relied upon by the lender in agreeing to extend credit to
the primary obligor. See supra note 264. The objection seems to presuppose the empirical
proposition that lenders generally regard personal guaranties as so important at the inception of a
lending relationship that a failure to supply them would result in a rejection of the application for
credit. I see no reason to suppose that proposition to be true in any significant number of cases. It
seems more likely that, in extending credit, lenders rely most heavily on such factors as the
availability of collateral, the viability of the project or business for which the loan is sought, and
the capitalization of the business. Moreover, reliance on a personal guaranty by a lender seems
more likely at a later stage of the lending relationship, when the factors that induced the loan
initially no longer give sufficient comfort to the lender.
Second, one might object that the disbursement of loan funds (or commitment to extend
credit) at the inception of the lending relationship is a significant event that causes the
contemporaneous guarantor to deliberate thoroughly before making his promise. Again, however,
there is reason to doubt the empirical premise of the objection. Why should it be assumed that a
guarantor who makes his promise at the inception of a lending relationship (when business
projections are typically favorable) will be more cautious or deliberate than a guarantor who
makes his promise when business is shaky and the lender is nervous? If the answer is that the
subsequent guarantor is more likely to have been deceived or pressured by the lender or the
primary obligor, the misconduct-based defenses are adequate protection, just as they are for the
contemporaneous guarantor.
267. Classical and neo-classical theories of contract have been criticized by relational theorists
for excessive "discreteness," i.e., for isolating distinct "promises" from the context in which they
occur and the ongoing relationships of which they are a part. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Last
Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 308-11 (1992); Wallace K. Lightsey, A
Critique of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45, 49-52 (1984). The
classical bargain theory of consideration required not only isolation, but pairing of such discrete
promises, as a necessary condition of promissory enforcement. It has been suggested that, if a
relational perspective is adopted, instances of "past consideration" can be classified as beneficial
exchanges worthy of enforcement. See Michael D. Bayles, Legally Enforceable Commitments, 4
LAW AND PHIL. 311, 333 (1985). Such a perspective might enable the recognition, for example,
that Mrs. Hudson's execution of a guaranty of Baker Street's antecedent debt is motivated by at
least a vague expectation of some as yet undefined reciprocal benefit from the lender or Baker
Street and is thus not radically different in kind from a classical bargain.
268. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(44), 9-203 (1989). The reader will, I hope, forgive the
extraterritorial application of the U.C.C.
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issued in partial payment.269 Commercial practice, and the statute that is
its most successful codification, recognize the right of a creditor who
desires additional security to seek and obtain new or additional collateral
or partial payment unfettered by the common law doctrine of past consideration. Ironically, the common law lags behind in refusing to recognize the post-loan personal guaranty, which is arguably an inferior form
of security.
Commercial law would be more coherent if post-loan personal
guaranties were generally recognized in the same way that post-loan collateralization is recognized, subject to traditional defenses of fraud,
duress, or undue influence. The most coherent system would apply such
270
a rule even to business principals and their friends and relatives.
Using the doctrine of past consideration as a gatekeeper to stop their
guaranties can be explained (although not justified) on grounds of a
vague sense of sympathy. Anyone with an extended family of any size
has at least one profligate or imprudent relative whose obligations he
would not wish to assume but whom it is awkward to refuse. No such
sympathy explains blocking Mrs. Hudson's guaranty. If her guaranty is
invalidated, Reiter's prediction has come true; a "rule" has been applied
when its stated, but not its actual, ground is present. The guarantor in
Morel was little more than Mrs. Hudson brought into the present, transformed from a landlord into an employer and moved to the country. He
apparently saw a long-term business advantage in keeping his employees' lender happy by signing a personal guaranty. Unless he could
prove a traditional misconduct defense, his guaranty should have been
enforced.
B.

ConsiderationDoctrine as a Covert Way of Policingfor Fairness

The use of the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration as
devices for policing misconduct thus produces effects ranging from
mere redundancy to positive harm. The same is true of the somewhat
less frequent use of consideration doctrine as a way to police the fairness
of an agreement.
Overt appeals to the reasonableness or fairness of transactions are
not frequently authorized in the law of contracts, and the express use of
consideration doctrine in tandem with such an appeal is correspondingly
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88(a) (1979).
270. As the text implies, I regard this increased coherence of the law surrounding credit
practices as a sufficient reason to abandon the present rule that denies enforcement of subsequent

269. See U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(3) (1989); RESTATEMENT

guaranties and to adopt a presumption in favor of their enforcement, subject to the traditional
misconduct-based defenses. See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. Rav. 273
(1992) (explaining the desirability of "local coherence").
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rare. In re Four Star Music Co., Inc. 2 7 1 was such an exceptional situation. The plaintiff, Pippin Way, Inc., sought to lift the automatic stay
imposed by the Bankruptcy Act to reclaim a music catalog Pippin Way
had purchased at a private foreclosure sale conducted by a Tennessee
bank.27 2 Foreclosure sales of personal property are governed by U.C.C.
§ 9-504(3), which expressly subjects such sales to a requirement of commercial reasonableness.
Tennessee banks have a rather colorful reputation,27 3 and the Four
Star case provides some of the raw material from which such reputations
are made. The bank was experiencing financial difficulties. Its management was anxious to avoid both the perception that it was suffering
losses on large loans and the accumulation in the bank's hands of large
amounts of property as the result of foreclosures.2 74 When the bank was
forced to declare Four Star in default, the officer in charge of the Four
Star account found an innovative way to achieve the bank's goals. First,
he ordered an independent appraisal of the catalog from a local attorney.27 5 When he learned that the attorney's appraisal would be low, he
instructed the attorney not to reduce his findings to writing, apparently
to avoid disclosure to the bank's auditors. 276 The bank officer then prepared his own appraisal, using figures supplied by a mysterious individual identified as "John Beanstalk. ' 277 The bank officer did not solicit
any music industry investors who might be interested in purchasing such
specialized collateral, and he even rebuffed or avoided a few of them.2 78
Instead, he sold the catalog to Pippin Way for a million dollars. 279 Pippin Way "paid" with a million-dollar promissory note. 2 80 The purchase
271. 2 B.R. 454 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979).
272. Id. at 456. The catalog, a collection of musical compositions and associated copyright
and contract rights, had originally belonged to the bankrupt corporation, Four Star Music, Inc.
Four Star had granted a security interest in the catalog to a Nashville bank. Id.
273. Perhaps the most significant contributors to that reputation were two brothers, Jake
Butcher and C.H. Butcher, Jr. Their flamboyant antics led to the collapse of twelve banks,
approximately $700 million in losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and a twentyyear prison sentence for Jake Butcher. See Stan Crock, Washington Turns Up the Heat on
Banking a la Bert Lance, Bus. WK., Oct. 7, 1985, at 78; Howard Kurtz, C.H. Butcher Indictedfor
Defrauding Investors, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1986, at B9; James Sterngold, Tennessee Banker is
Given 20-Year Jail Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1985, at At; A Prison Term for Jake Butcher, Bus.
WK., June 17, 1985, at 44; Laying Bare the Risks of Diversified Banking, Bus. WK., Mar. 7. 1983,
at 29.
274. 2 B.R. at 457.
275. Id.

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 457-58. The bank did not request a down payment or a personal endorsement by
Pippin Way's President and sole shareholder.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:45

and sale agreement gave Pippin Way an absolute right to rescind the
transaction at any time within one year of sale.28 Pippin Way neither
investigated the liens against the catalog nor received an appraisal of
it.282 The bank never requested financial statements from Pippin Way's
sole shareholder or proof of corporate authorization for the purchase.283
At the time of the sale, Pippin Way had just been (hastily) organized and
was not really authorized to transact business under Tennessee law,
since its minimum capital had not been paid in.2" 4 Pippin Way never
made any payments on the million-dollar note and never furnished operating statements to the bank, even though the bank made subsequent sixfigure loans to Pippin Way.28 5 Needless to say, such a transaction does
not reflect the manner in which country music catalogs are customarily
sold. 86
The bankruptcy court denied Pippin Way's motion to reclaim the
catalog. 287 The court first held that the transaction did not amount to a
sale.2 88 The presence in the agreement of an absolute right to rescind the
transaction made Pippin Way's commitment illusory. Pippin Way therefore supplied no consideration for the conveyance of the catalog. 289 As
an alternate ground of its decision, the court assumed that the transaction
was a sale and held it to be a commercially unreasonable disposition of
collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code. 290 Although a good
faith purchaser for value will normally take free of the debtor's interest
and security interests subordinate to that of the foreclosing creditor
notwithstanding the commercial unreasonableness of the disposition,29 '
Pippin Way failed to qualify as a good faith purchaser.292
One notable aspect of the court's opinion is the relative simplicity
of the first ground of its decision and the relative complexity of the
second. To find an absence of consideration, the court needed little
more factual support than the provision of the purchase and sale agreement that gave Pippin Way an absolute right to rescind the transaction.
The finding that the "sale" was a commercially unreasonable disposition
of collateral, in contrast, required investigation and use of all the messy
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461-64. Using Tennessee's version of U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1989).
2 B.R. at 464.
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facts recited above. The availability of the relatively simple "illusory
promise" defense did not actually shorten the record in Four Star. Nevertheless, it is possible to understand why courts might be drawn to the
doctrine of consideration and its corollary rules concerning illusory
promises as a short-cut 293 or as a covert way of policing transactions for
fairness in situations in which no direct authorization for an appeal to
commercial reasonableness is expressly invited.
There are recurring situations, however, in which the apparent simplicity of illusory promise analysis is a vice, not a virtue. An example of
such a case is provided by Commercial Movie Rental, Inc. v. Larry

Eagle, Inc.2 94 The plaintiff, Commercial Movie Rental, Inc., supplied
videotape cassettes and recorders to rental outlets.2 95 The defendant,
Larry Eagle, Inc., operated a small chain of convenience stores.29 6

Commercial and Eagle entered into an agreement that obligated Commercial to supply Eagle with videotapes and recorders and to train
Eagle's employees in the movie rental business. In return, Eagle was to
pay Commercial one half of its weekly rental revenue.2 97

One remedial clause of the agreement gave Eagle a choice of two
obligations if Eagle terminated or failed to renew the contract. 298 Eagle
either had to refrain from renting videocassettes and recorders for eighteen months, or it had to pay Commercial $650 per month for the privilege of competing in that business. 29 In addition, the contract contained
a clause exculpating Commercial from liability for "damages of any
kind, whether on account of the loss ... of present or prospective prof-

its, or anticipated sales, expenditures, investments, or commitments
made in connection with this agreement, or on account of any other
293. There are two cases in the relevant time period in which courts found the notion of an
illusory promise a convenient tool with which to upset transactions that apparently would have
defeated the legitimate claims of an ex-spouse. See O'Neill v. DeLaney, 415 N.E.2d 1260 (I11.

App. Ct. 1980) (alleged sale of Rubens painting to close friend for a miniscule fraction of its
worth); Estate of Haggerty, 805 P.2d 1338 (Mont. 1990) (attempt to recharacterize inter vivos
gifts by decedent as loans). In each case, the court was apparently spared the more searching

inquiry necessary to establish fraud, fraudulent conveyance, or similar theories, although more
evidence may have been before the court than is described in the opinion.

For a case in which the doctrine of unconscionability likely could have been substituted for
an application of the doctrine of past consideration, see Sager v. Basham, 401 S.E.2d 676 (Va.
1991) (after accused felon for whom bail bondsman has posted $50,000 bond failed to appear and
bondsman obtained "surety's capias" authorizing arrest of accused, bondsman obtained signature
of accused's mother on promissory note for $90,000).

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

738 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:45

event or cause whatsoever.' 300
Both parties performed for two years under the agreement. 30 ' After
an apparent misunderstanding in which one of Eagle's stores was understocked, Eagle found another videocassette supplier and resumed its
rental business. 3 2 Commercial brought suit to recover the monthly liquidated damages specified in the contract. 30 3 The court granted summary judgment in favor of Eagle.3°4 The court insisted on reading the
exculpatory clause as a total exemption from any liability for breach of
any kind. 3 5 This made Commercial's obligations under the agreement
illusory and in turn deprived the agreement of mutuality of obligation.30 6
The agreement, accordingly, was held unenforceable for lack of consideration, and Commercial could not recover the liquidated damages.30 7
Now it may be that the court reached a proper disposition of the
case. If so, it almost certainly did so for the wrong reason. Disposing of
the case on grounds of lack of consideration may have been elegant and
tidy, but the assertion that the Commercial/Eagle agreement was radically different from an ordinary bargain is ludicrous. It was a perfectly
ordinary ongoing business deal. The parties performed their duties
under it and split the profits from it for two years. The problem with the
agreement was not that it failed to qualify as a "deal" or an exchange,
but that it may have been so unfair or harsh to Eagle that relief from
certain aspects of the agreement was necessary. Certainly, it is tempting
to conclude that any agreement that absolutely deprives one party of any
remedy for breach is unconscionable as a matter of law.30 8 Thus, if the
court was correct in its interpretation of the exculpatory clause as a total
liability exemption, a finding of unconscionability might well be in
order.
Apart from the question of whether the exculpatory clause could
have been given a limiting construction, however, the liquidated damages clause is problematic. Even assuming the exculpatory clause could
be narrowed by interpretation, Commercial was free to walk away from
the agreement with limited liability. Eagle, on the other hand, had to
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 229.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. ld. at 231.
305. Id. at 230. Commercial had contended unsuccessfully that the exculpatory clause in the
contract was not a complete exemption from all liability but only a disclaimer of damages for lost
profits in the event video rental income did not meet the expectations of the retailer. Id. at 229.
306. Id. at 230-31.
307. Id. at 231.
308. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1989) (imposing, in the case of contracts for the sale of
goods, a requirement that there be "at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach").
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pay for the privilege of staying in the same business if it changed suppliers. Such a bargain may be sufficiently one-sided to be unconscionable,
or it may just reflect a fair price for Commercial's technical expertise or
good will. However, a final determination that it was unconscionable
would have required the court to examine a number of issues, including
the relative sophistication and bargaining power of the parties, the cir-

cumstances under which the agreement was negotiated, whether the noncompetition/liquidated damages provision could be justified by Com-

mercial's provision of training services or confidential information or by
its building of good will, and any of the numerous factors that are relevant to a determination of unconscionability. Inquiry into such issues is,
to be sure, messier and more complicated than dismissing a case on
grounds of lack of consideration.
In Commercial Movie, however, the fairness of the agreement was
the real issue.3" By expressly declining to address the issue of unconscionability and deciding the case on the basis of the "illusory promise"
corollary to the doctrine of consideration, the court dispensed with all
the factual inquiries that might have revealed whether or not the deal

was fair enough to enforce. In short, the doctrine of consideration made
a difficult case look easier than it really was and provided no guarantee
that the disposition of the case was the same as would have been reached
upon a full inquiry into the real questions at issue.310 It may be granted
309. See also Fenberg v. Goggin, 800 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (suggesting one-sided
contract is invalid because plaintiffs commitment is illusory, but allowing recovery in quantum
meruit for fair value of labor).
310. Nor is Commercial Movie the only case of its kind. A similar artificial narrowing of the
issues through the use of the doctrine of consideration occurred in Robert L. Haag, Inc. v. Swift &
Co., 530 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 696 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1982). Haag, a marketing firm,
entered into an agreement with Swift, a major food product manufacturer, that gave Swift the
exclusive right to participate in Haag's marketing program in the "processed meats" category. Id.
at 516. In return, Haag received a monthly fee. Id. The agreement provided for Swift's
participation in the program in an initial test area and subsequent expansion into a second area. Id.
Either party had the privilege of terminating the agreement on ninety days notice, except that
Swift's termination right was not effective until Swift had participated in the program in the
second (expanded) area for twelve months. Id. Finally, the agreement provided that neither party
could recover damages from the other for breach, except that Haag could recover its monthly fees.
Id. When Swift terminated prior to expansion of the program into the second market, Haag sued
to recover its monthly fees. Id. The district court held that Haag's obligations were illusory and
that the agreement failed for lack of mutuality of obligation. Id. The Second Circuit reversed,
finding that Haag provided consideration by giving Swift the exclusive right to participate in the
processed meats portion of the program. Robert L. Haag, Inc. v. Swift & Co., 696 F.2d 30, 32 (2d
Cir. 1982). Both the trial court and the appellate court were thus distracted by the consideration
issue, which offered the lower court the possibility of a speedy and simple disposition. Once
again, however, the transaction at issue was clearly a business deal not significantly different from
a more conventional bargain, and it was performed for more than two years. The real question
should have been whether a provision that clearly deprived one party of any damage remedy is
unconscionable. While it is initially plausible to suppose any such provision should be

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:45

that proof of unconscionability is often difficult. But among businesses
with no apparent disparity in bargaining power, it usually should be.
If the "simplification" made possible by the doctrine of consideration is oversimplification, the use of consideration doctrine as a covert
device for policing transactions for fairness is also just another way of
"dressing decisions in disguise." Accordingly, it is subject to Reiter's
catalog of vices.311 Indeed, although Llewellyn recognized that consideration doctrine was, in fact, used to police for fairness, he demonstrated
that it is more ill-adapted than most doctrines to serve that function.312
The core of the problem is that the doctrine of consideration itself counsels that fairness of a transaction is irrelevant. 313 Anyone who does
research on contract law wishes she had a quarter for every time she
heard, "A court will not examine the adequacy of consideration. 31 4 As
a guide to a lawyer in her role as counselor, therefore, consideration
doctrine presents a dual threat.315 If the lawyer actually structures transactions on the theory that fairness is irrelevant, she will find those transactions upset occasionally, randomly, and unpredictably.316 If, on the
unconscionable as a matter of law, the fact that Swift, a food industry giant with no lack of
bargaining power, agreed to such a provision should lead to some hesitation in deciding the issue
in a summary fashion. Because of its focus on the consideration issue, however, the district court
did not analyze the circumstances under which the provision was negotiated or the business
justifications that might be given for it.
311. See supra notes 249-257 and accompanying text.
312. See Llewellyn, supra note 140, at 865-66.
at 866.
313. See id.
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(b) cmt. c (1979).
315. See Llewellyn, supra note 140, at 866.
316. See id. Indeed, courts have occasionally misapplied the doctrine of consideration to reach
a result regarded as fair. See, e.g., Joneil Fifth Ave. Ltd. v. Ebeling & Reuss Co., 458 F. Supp.
1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). A wholesaler (Ebeling) was the exclusive distributor for a planned series
of sixteen collectible porcelain figurines. A retailer (Joneil) placed an order for 600 of the first
figurine in the series and received a confirmation form providing that deliveries would be "based
on availability" and that allocation of merchandise might be necessary. Due to a computer
malfunction, Ebeling accepted more orders than there were figurines and sought to allocate its
supply among various customers. Joneil was offered 300 figurines, but the parties could not reach
agreement. Ultimately, Ebeling refused to sell Joneil any of the figurines. Joneil brought suit
seeking damages, specific performance, and a preliminary injunction against disposition of the
figurines. Joneil sought relief not only for the original order of 600 figurines, but also for 600 of
each of the remaining fifteen figurines in the contemplated series. Joneil contended (and Ebeling
apparently conceded) that, under customs prevailing in the trade, an order for the first in such a
series generated an option for the same quantity of each subsequent item in the series.
Accordingly, Joneil's damage claim grew to $8.8 million. The court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction, suggesting, in the process, that the options on future figurines might be
unenforceable. The options appeared to the court to lack mutuality since they were "one way"
(the buyer was permitted, but not required, to buy the subsequent figurines). Thus, on the record
before the court, it appeared both parties were not bound, and therefore, neither could be bound.
The court's reasoning is absolutely baffling. All options, by definition, are "one way," in the
sense that the optionee may, but need not, exercise the option. That fact does not cause them to
violate the rules on consideration. Moreover, since the same consideration can support any
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other hand, the lawyer assumes that fairness is relevant, she will encounter an opposite but equally dangerous risk. The orthodox doctrine that
courts do not examine the adequacy of consideration actually makes
fairness irrelevant when the doctrine is in the hands of less activist
judges.3" 7 Use of the doctrine of consideration to police for fairness thus
contains a special built-in form of incoherence.
C.

ConsiderationDoctrine and Disguised Policy Judgments

There is a further class of cases in which the use of the corollaries
to the doctrine of consideration appears pretextual. In this type of case,
it appears the courts are using consideration doctrine as a covert way of
making a policy judgment without having to support it explicitly.
Some of the best examples of such pretextual use of a corollary to
the doctrine of consideration have come from the lower appellate courts
of New York. In these cases, the courts employed the doctrine of mutuality of obligation to invalidate arbitration clauses that effectively compelled one party to arbitrate any disputes but left the other free to choose
litigation or arbitration. 3 8 This use of the requirement of mutuality was
ultimately unmasked in Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co. 3 19 Sablosky

was a real estate salesman employed by a large real estate brokerage
firm (Gordon).3 2 ° Upon his termination, Sablosky claimed that he had
sold a building and earned a commission of $3.6 million. 321 The
employment agreement upon which Sablosky sued contained an arbitration clause that made arbitration mandatory for Sablosky but optional for
Gordon.322 At the trial court level, Gordon obtained an order compelnumber of return promises, it is not clear why the initial order of figurines and the buyer's promise
to pay for it could not serve as consideration, not only for the seller's initial delivery obligation,

but for the option on future figurines as well. The court's misapplication of the requirement of
mutuality is probably explainable as the product of a desire to avoid giving extraordinary relief to
a buyer who refused an apparently reasonable (and contractually permissible) allocation and tried
to turn a computer glitch into an eight million dollar bonanza. See also Am. Medical Int'l, Inc. v.
Scheller, 462 So. 2d I (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (misapplication of the doctrine of mutuality of

obligation to reach fair interpretation of contract).
317. See Llewellyn, supra note 140, at 866.
318. See, e.g., Wolfman v. Herbstritt, 495 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Cored Panels,

Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp., 420 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Regeant of
Shelby, Inc. v. Leumas Knitting Mills, Inc., 387 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); see also
Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying New York law); Stevens/
Leinweber/Sullens, Inc. v. Holm Dev. and Management, Inc., 795 P.2d 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990) (applying Arizona law); R.W. Roberts Constr. Co. v. St. Johns River Water Management

Dist., 423 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (applying Florida law).
319.
320.
321.
322.

526 N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 535 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id. Though the employment agreement had been terminated by mutual agreement, the
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ling arbitration of the commission dispute.32 3 The appellate division
reversed, specifically holding the arbitration clause to be unenforceable
on the grounds that it lacked mutuality of obligation.32 4
The court of appeals reversed the appellate division and reinstated
the order compelling arbitration.3 25 Initially, the court of appeals contributed greatly to the clarification of the issue by recharacterizing the
requirement imposed by the appellate division as a requirement of mutuality of remedy, rather than a requirement of mutuality of obligation.32 6
The court of appeals further held that the strict reciprocity that goes by
the name "mutuality of remedy" was not a requirement of arbitration
clauses specifically or contracts more generally. 327 As long as the entire
agreement was supported by some consideration, the "arbitration
option" was valid, and there was no further requirement that the obligations imposed on each party be coextensive.3 28 The court of appeals
proceeded to address the real issue in the case, an issue which had been
obscured up to that point by all the talk of "mutuality." The court
plaintiff had remained a salaried employee for more than a year thereafter. At trial, he apparently
contended that the original agreement had not been terminated properly. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 645 (N.Y. 1989).
326. Id. at 646.
327. Id. In some instances, a requirement of mutuality of remedy is, in effect, derived from the
requirement of mutuality of obligation by classifying the arbitration clause as a separate or
"separable" agreement, requiring its own consideration. See, e.g., Stevens/Leinweber/Sullens,
Inc. v. Holm Dev. and Management, Inc., 795 P.2d 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); R.W. Roberts
Constr. Co. v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 423 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
The classification of one clause of an agreement as important enough to be "separable" and to
require its own symmetrical consideration is a policy judgment, which may be more or less
disguised. Indeed, there are certain policy-based, highly derivative uses of the phrase "mutuality
of obligation" in which it ceases to have any connection with the doctrine of consideration at all.
See, e.g., Adams v. Resolution Trust Corp., 927 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1991) (allegedly offsetting
claims of different ranks under federal priority scheme for liquidating insolvent thrifts lack
"mutuality of obligation").
328. 538 N.Y.S.2d at 646; see also Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979). In
Ryan, a retail employee sued her employer (J.C. Penney) for breach of contract. The employee
contended she had been promised that she would not be discharged except for cause and that the
promise had been broken. The employer contended that she was terminable at will and trotted out
the familiar argument that because the plaintiff was free to leave at will, a promise such as that
alleged by plaintiff could not be enforced for lack of mutuality. After noting the ambiguity of the
word "mutuality," the court distinguished carefully between a requirement of consideration, which
it accepted, and a requirement of symmetry in the obligations of the parties, which it rejected.
Since the employee had alleged sufficient consideration to support the alleged employment
agreement, there was no further requirement of "mutuality of obligation." For the heresy of
talking sense, the court was unceremoniously reversed by the Seventh Circuit. Ryan v. J.C.
Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980); cf. Simmons v. Sowela Technical Inst., 470 So. 2d 913
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (relationship between student and nursing school not bilateral contract where
student has no legally enforceable civil obligation to continue to maintain prescribed level of
achievement and abide by disciplinary regulations).

1993]

CONSIDERATION

addressed the question of whether an arbitration clause mandatory for
one party but optional for the other was unconscionable.32 9 The court
found no evidence of procedural unconscionability in the form of deceptive language, high pressure tactics, or grossly unequal bargaining
power.330 The arbitration provision also was not so -unreasonably
favorable to one party that it could be classified as substantively unconscionable, given the characteristics of the real estate brokerage
business.3 3

Sablosky and its predecessors illustrate the dangers inherent in
using the doctrine of consideration as a covert way to make policy
choices or decide questions of fairness. It may be that enforcing oneway arbitration clauses is always bad policy, or it may be that such
clauses operate unfairly in some contexts but not in others. Mischaracterizing such questions as questions of consideration has at least
two major disadvantages. First, because of the traditional gatekeeping
function of the doctrine of consideration, such a mischaracterization
appears to dictate an all-or-nothing approach. One-way arbitration
clauses either lack mutuality, and thus are all unenforceable, or they do
not lack mutuality, and thus are presumptively enforceable. The more
careful, case-by-case analysis of fairness of formation and operation
conducted by the court of appeals seems precluded. Second, the mischaracterization of questions of policy or fairness as questions of consideration may lead to the wrong answer. Whether one-way arbitration
clauses should be enforced is a policy question. If the correct answer to
that policy question is "sometimes, depending upon whether it is fair in
the circumstances," a gatekeeper doctrine that says "never" is bound to
mislead in a certain range of cases. Once the court of appeals recast the
issue as a problem of unconscionability in the particularcontext and
focused on the usual factual inquiries, the question no longer seemed
particularly difficult.
A related difficulty created by using the doctrine of consideration
as a pretext for a policy judgment is illustrated by a past consideration
case, Gulf Towing Co. v. STEAM TANKER, AMOCO NEW YORK. 332
The case arose when a harbor tug, the TAMPA, sank while assisting the
STEAM TANKER, AMOCO NEW YORK into port.3 3 3 At the time of
the sinking, Enno, a local pilot, was piloting the AMOCO NEW
YORK. 334 Enno's negligence in piloting the AMOCO NEW YORK
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Sablosky, 535 N.E.2d at 646-47.
Id. at 647.
Id.
648 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 243.
Id.
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was the cause of the unfortunate demise of the TAMPA, and, under
admiralty law, such negligence was imputed to the AMOCO NEW
YORK in rem.' 5 Enno was apparently no fool, for, as soon as the
AMOCO NEW YORK had docked safely (and while the TAMPA was
presumably still sending up bubbles), he presented the captain of the
AMOCO NEW YORK with a pilotage agreement. 336 The pilotage
agreement contained a clause that completely exculpated Enno from any
liability for his own negligence and imposed upon the AMOCO NEW
YORK and her owners and operators an obligation to indemnify the
pilot against any claims brought against him. 337 The captain of the
AMOCO NEW YORK dutifully signed the agreement without reading
it, as was apparently his custom. 338 When the owner and charterer of the
TAMPA sued the AMOCO NEW YORK, its owner, and Enno, the
owner of the AMOCO NEW YORK asserted a cross-claim against
Enno. 339 Enno raised the exculpatory provision of the pilotage agreement by way of defense. 34 0 The district court held that the exculpatory
it lacked consideration and
clause was unenforceable both 3because
41
policy.
public
because it violated
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
embracing only the lack of consideration rationale. 342 The court concluded that the exculpatory clause was not part of a bargained exchange,
in part because the pilotage agreement was not executed until after Enno
had rendered his services. 343 The court at least inclined toward the view
asserted by the owner of the AMOCO NEW YORK that the document
in question was a mere receipt. 3 " The court declined to rule on the
public policy defense and rested its decision solely on lack of consideration.34 5 It is a good bet, however, that the court would have concluded
that the exculpatory clause violated public policy, had the court
addressed the issue. While it is fairly debatable whether disclaimers of
negligence liability should ever be permitted, little can be said in favor
of an inadvertant waiver of negligence remedies. The result in the case,
therefore, likely would have been the same had the public policy question been faced directly and expressly used as the ground for the deci335. Id.

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 244.

341. Id.
342. Id. at 245-46.

343. Id.
344. Id. at 246.
345. Id.
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sion.34 6 The most unfortunate aspect of the court's sole reliance on
consideration doctrine was that it provided less guidance for the future
than it might have. Had it faced and decided the public policy issue, it
would have been forced to determine whether all pilotage negligence
disclaimers, or only those extracted after-the-fact from unknowing customers, were unenforceable. An important question of policy was thus
postponed, probably because the doctrine of past consideration is relatively technical and easy to apply.347

IV.

ADDITIONAL HARM CAUSED BY THE DOCTRINE OF
CONSIDERATION

The cases examined above included many in which consideration
doctrine was either redundant or pretextual. In many instances, the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration were ill-adapted to perform indirect functions, and they produced adverse side effects. There are also
cases, however, in which consideration doctrine is not used as a covert
346. Cf. Kastil v. Caro, 536 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (alleged oral agreement by
lawyer held unenforceable both because sexual services may not provide part of consideration for
contract and because past consideration is no consideration).
There are a number of cases in which promises or transactions were invalidated because they
were based upon "illegal consideration." Such cases are not really corollaries to the requirement
of bargained exchange at all. Most involve genuine bargains, albeit bargains that a court or
legislature has condemned on policy grounds. Accordingly, such cases are really just applications
of the defense of illegality and thus are beyond the scope of this Article. See Kallen v. Delug, 203
Cal. Rptr. 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (promise by new attorney to share fee with discharged
attorney in exchange for discharged attorney's agreement not to withhold client files and
substitution form); Orange County Found. for Preservation of Pub. Property v. Irvine Co., 188
Cal. Rptr. 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (allegedly unconstitutional settlement of frivolous claim
involving payment of public funds); Starr v. Robinson, 351 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(agreement under which attorney also provided real estate brokerage services without a license);
Douglas v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 228 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (refinancing loan that violated
state statute), overruled by Henson v. Dixie Fin. Corp. of Ga., 296 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. 1982); Harris
v. Johnson, 578 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (alleged promise by newly-elected mayor to
appoint plaintiff police chief); Hyman v. Davies, 453 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (agreement
to pay for damages caused by son's crime on condition neighbors refuse to prosecute); Barbat v.
M.E. Arden Co., 254 N.W.2d 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (alleged brokerage agreement
committing agent to act on behalf of both buyer and seller); Otten v. Otten, 632 S.W.2d 45 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) (prospective agreement to reduce child support); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 575
S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Rose v. Elias, 576 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(alleged promise to purchase apartment in return for "love and affection," including adulterous
relationship); Kastil v. Carro, 536 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (promise of financial
security for past services, including sexual relationship); International Aircraft Sales, Inc., v.
Betancourt, 582 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (note tainted by illegal smuggling transaction).
347. The doctrine of illusory promises is also occasionally used in the service of judgments of
public policy. See, e.g., Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Abel, 338 N.W.2d 531 (Ia. Ct. App. 1983) (misapplies
doctrine of illusory promises to invalidate covenant not to compete); see also Newman v.
Sablosky, 407 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (invalidation of covenant not to compete because
promisor agreed to it after initial agreement for sale of medical practice).
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substitute for another doctrine but in which its effects are nonetheless
undesirable.
A.

Use of the Doctrine of Consideration to Avoid Decision of
Evidentiary Questions

There is one somewhat subtle way in which the doctrine of past
consideration has distorted the disposition of cases and created a risk of
underenforcement. In some cases, a court uses the doctrine of past consideration as a surrogate for its doubts that the promise at issue was ever

made. There can be no substantive harm if the court makes (or affirms)
an honest credibility determination that the promise was not made 348 and
then adds that, even if it had been made, it was unenforceable because it
was supported only by past consideration. In such a case, the doctrine of
past consideration is merely superfluous.34 9

More disturbing are cases in which the doctrine of past consideration is used to avoid making a factual finding with regard to the making
of the alleged promise, the circumstances of its making, or the presence

or absence of reliance or a past benefit. Such a use of the doctrine of
past consideration is particularly tempting in cases in which the promisor has died,35° but it is not confined to cases of dead promisors. Tim
W. Koerner & Associates, Inc. v. Aspen Labs, Inc. 351 appears to be an
instance of the pretextual use of the rule on past consideration. In that

case, Aspen, a manufacturer of electrosurgical products, was acquired by
Zimmer, a manufacturer of orthopedic products. 352 Zimmer then termi348. See, e.g., Schoenfeld v. Ochsenhaut, 452 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982). In that case,
a man named Alexander Ochsenhaut died alone in his apartment in Brooklyn. Two of his
neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Schoenfeld, searched for any surviving relatives but were unsuccessful.
The Schoenfelds were Orthodox Jews and were advised by their rabbi that it was extremely
important that Ochsenhaut, who was also Jewish, receive a proper religious burial. The
Schoenfelds then engaged the services of an appropriate funeral home and became obligated to
pay its charges. After the funeral, Alexander Ochsenhaut's long-lost brother Irving appeared after
a thirty-seven-year absence. The Schoenfelds alleged that Irving then promised that he would pay
for the funeral. Irving contended that he had only promised a donation to a local synagogue. The
court found that the promise to pay for Alexander's funeral was never made. The court also held
that, even if it had been made, the Schoenfelds had no legal claim against Irving. See also
Marcotte v. Harrison, 443 A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1982) (finding maker of note lied about promise to
cancel existing debt and that note lacked consideration).
349. It should be added that, if the doctrine of consideration does no harm in such cases, it
likewise does no good.
350. See Whitmire v. Watkins, 267 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1980) (suit brought in 1977 to enforce
promise to devise land made in 1944 allegedly in return for services performed between 1923 and
1929); Lesnik v. Estate of Lesnik, 403 N.E.2d 683 (I11.App. Ct. 1980) ("moral consideration"
doctrine used to avoid deciding whether decedent's alleged promise to transfer interest in land had
been made).
351. 492 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
352. Id. at 297.
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nated Aspen's independent distributor network and replaced it with its
own distribution system.35 3 Plaintiff Koerner had owned one of the terminated distributors. Koerner and his companies brought a variety of
complicated antitrust claims against Aspen, Zimmer, and Zimmer's parent (Bristol-Myers Company), all of which were determined to be without merit on defendants' motion for summary judgment.35 4 Plaintiffs
also engaged in last-minute procedural and discovery maneuvers in an
attempt to avoid summary judgment, none of which impressed the
court.3 5 By the time the court reached plaintiffs' pendent state law contract claims, one gets the impression the court was growing weary of the
whole dispute and a trifle impatient with the plaintiffs. Among the contracts alleged by plaintiffs was an "override" agreement between Aspen
and Zimmer to compensate old Aspen dealers for their past efforts.3 56
The court held that it was unenforceable because it was based on past
consideration.35 7 This is simply wrong, even as a matter of consideration doctrine. If, as part of the acquisition of Aspen by Zimmer, Zimmer
promised to retain or pay Aspen's old distributors and the two parties
really intended to benefit the distributors, the consideration that supported the acquisition agreement supported the promise for the benefit of
the distributors.3 5 The fact that Aspen's motive in extracting Zimmer's
promise was gratitude for past services is either irrelevant or, if the past
services imposed contractual obligations to the distributors on Aspen
which had not yet been satisfied, it made the distributors creditor beneficiaries. 359 The malleability of the doctrine of consideration has been
recognized by its critics. 3 ° When the doctrine is twisted to the point of
misapplication to deny recovery to a vexatious plaintiff, however, one
suspects that it is a pretext for a covert conclusion that the promise
asserted by the plaintiff was not made. If that suspicion is correct, the
familiar dangers of disguised grounds of decision are presented. In addition, because the existence of the promise is normally a question of fact,
pretextual use of the doctrine of consideration is a usurpation of the
function of the jury.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 297-303. The court characterized the antitrust claims as an "effort by the mere

lavish use of antitrust language to transform a sow's ear fact pattern into a silk purse filled with
treble damage gold." Id. at 303.
355. Id. at 297-98.
356. Id. at 303.
357. Id.
358. The distributors would be entitled to enforce the promise as third-party beneficiaries. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs §§ 302-304 (1979).
359. See id. § 302.
360. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 2, at 57-65.
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Distraction and Confusion in Promissory Estoppel Cases

The doctrine of past consideration, in particular, seems to produce
distortions in the application of the theory of promissory estoppel. One
of the clearest illustrations of this phenomenon is Insilco Corp. v. First
National Bank of Dalton.361 Insilco was a corporation with its main
office in Minnesota.362 It supplied building materials and supplies to the
Mulls in Georgia, securing the price of the materials by taking a second
security deed on the Mulls' real estate. 363 The real estate was encumbered by a senior security deed in favor of the First National Bank of
Dalton, but the bank's loan was relatively small. 361 After Insilco
extended credit to the Mulls, Insilco sent the bank a letter notifying the
bank that Insilco intended to take a second security deed on the property
and requesting the bank to notify Insilco if the Mulls became seriously
delinquent in their payments to the bank or if the bank intended to
366
commence foreclosure. 365 The bank agreed in writing to do

SO.

When the Mulls defaulted and the bank foreclosed, however, the bank
gave only the local notice by publication required by statute.3 67 Insilco
received no notice of the foreclosure and took no steps to protect its
interest. 368 Insilco's rights against the Mulls were cut off by discharge
in bankruptcy.

369

Insilco filed a complaint against the bank on theories of breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud. 370 The trial court dismissed
Insilco's complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed with respect to the contract and estoppel counts.37 1
The contract count was defective, the court held, because consideration
361. 274 S.E.2d (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 283 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. 1981).

362.
363.
364.
365.

274 S.E.2d at 768.
283 S.E.2d at 262-63.
Id. at 262.
274 S.E.2d at 768.

366. Id.

367. Id.
368. 283 S.E.2d at 263. While the opinions of the Court of Appeals of Georgia and Supreme
Court of Georgia are not clear on the point, one may surmise that the bids at the foreclosure sale
were at or near the rather small amount of the bank's debt, even if that amount was not reflective

of the true market value of the property. If so, Insilco's lien would be cut off, in spite of the fact
that the property had sufficient value to support both liens, unless Insilco could show grounds for

setting aside the foreclosure sale. This rather unappetizing scenario was precisely what happened
to Insilco in a factually indistinguishable case. Miles Home Div. of Insilco Corp. v. First State
Bank of Joplin, 782 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). In contrast to the Court of Appeals of
Georgia, however, the Missouri Court of Appeals had no difficulty in finding the bank's promise
to give
369.
370.
371.

notice enforceable on a theory of promissory estoppel.
283 S.E.2d at 263.
274 S.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 768-69.
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for the promise to notify was lacking.372 At the time the bank's promise
to notify Insilco was made, Insilco's loan to the Mulls had already been
made. There was no other consideration provided to the Mulls or the
bank for the bank's promise.373 By an extremely puzzling chain of reasoning the court then concluded that, because there was no contract,
Insilco had no right to rely on the bank's promise.37 4 Such an inference
is effectively a holding that there is no such thing as promissory estoppel, a fact that the Georgia Supreme Court recognized at once.3 75 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals as to the estoppel count,
noting simply that "promissory estoppel has been adopted in Georgia.''376 The confusion of the court of appeals, apparently generated by
the doctrine of past consideration, was thus ultimately dispelled.37 7
The misapplication of the theory of promissory estoppel is somewhat surprising. While there are lingering debates about the true explanation and justification for liability based on promissory estoppel, 378 its
evolution as a straightforward exception to the "requirement" of consideration is well-known. There should no longer be any difficulty in
regarding reliance and traditional consideration as alternate, and equally
sufficient, bases of contractual liability. 379 The rhetoric associated with
the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration, however, has
not disappeared, and it is difficult to identify any other factor that would
produce the bungling of the promissory estoppel theory in cases in
which such rhetoric appears.
C. Complexity, Uneven Application, and Underenforcement
Although the doctrine of consideration is anything but simple and
372. Id. at 768.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. 283 S.E.2d at 262-63.
376. Id. at 263.
377. Not all cases have a similar happy ending. See, e.g., Gladstone v. McHenry Medical
Group, 553 N.E.2d 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (refusing to enforce promise to pay founding partners
of medical practice 1% charge, in part because founded on past consideration of building the
practice, and neglecting obvious question whether one partner relied on promise by retiring early);
see also Carolina Eastern, Inc. v. Benson Agri Supply, Inc., 310 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(past consideration rule used to deny enforcement of subsequent guaranty in spite of creditor's
offer to prove reliance in forbearance from collection efforts). The disposition of Carolina
Eastern presumably could not be corrected because North Carolina clings to the doctrine of
consideration more tightly than most jurisdictions and does not yet recognize the affirmative use
of promissory estoppel. See Home Electric Co. of Lenoir v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air
Conditioning Co., 358 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
378. See generally Feinman, supra note 267; Yorio & Thel, supra note 5.
379. It is possible to dismiss misapplications of doctrine as simple cases of judicial stupidity.
Such a minimization of erroneous decisions is not altogether wise. When judges make mistakes,
those mistakes may very well be phenomena worthy of explanation.
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elegant, its corollaries are often formulated with deceptive simplicity.
The requirement of mutuality of obligation, for example, is sometimes
formulated as the principle that both parties to a contract must be bound
or neither is bound. 38 So formulated, the principle is a gross overgeneralization. By definition, it cannot apply to unilateral contracts. It is also
subject to a number of outright exceptions, including the familiar
instances in which voidable promises serve as consideration for return
" ' The drafters of the Restatement (Second)
promises.38
of Contracts
found the principle sufficiently misleading to recommend dispensing
with the term "mutuality of obligation" altogether.382
Similarly, the principle that past consideration is no consideration
is an overgeneralization. Exceptions have evolved over time and seem
to be the subject of general agreement. As with any other promise, a
promise purportedly based only on past consideration could, nonetheless, be the object of subsequent reasonable reliance and be enforceable
under a theory of promissory estoppel. 383 If the "past consideration"
upon which a promise is allegedly based was some benefit conferred by
the promisee on the. promisor, the subsequent promise may be enforceable on a restitution theory, since the promise may negate any assumption
that the prior benefit was conferred officiously or as a gift. 384 There are
several cases in the relevant time period in which courts strained to find
ways to enforce subsequent promises to pay finder's fees to individuals
who had located real property or business opportunities, with the courts
sometimes manipulating restitution principles and sometimes performing other mental gymnastics. 85 Such exceptions to the doctrine of past
consideration are now relatively uncontroversial.386
380. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. f (1979).
381. See id. § § 78, 79 cmt. f.
382. See id. § 79(c).
383. See id. § 90.
384. See id. § 86 cmt. b.
385. See Womer Agency, Inc. v. Doyle, 479 N.E.2d 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (enforcement of
promise to pay finder's fee based on benefit received); see also Sheehy v. Bodin, 349 N.W.2d 353
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (promise of finder's fee enforced because, in addition to finding property,
plaintiff was presently "willing to help process" project); Roark v. Stallworth Oil and Gas, Inc.,
813 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1991) (reversing summary judgment to give an opportunity to prove that
fee for "originating interest" in drilling site involved present exchange of services as well). Other
methods occasionally used by courts in an effort to avoid the rigors of the doctrine of past
consideration include construing apparently consecutive documents as part of the same
transaction, so that consideration for one supports the other as well. See Soukop v. Snyder, 709
P.2d 109 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
386. If the existence of exceptions to the rule that "past consideration is no consideration" is
uncontroversial, however, the theoretical basis for the exceptions is not. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 86 presumes a basis for the exceptions in the law of restitution and its goal of
avoiding unjust enrichment. More recently, Michael Bayles urged a broader recognition of past
benefits as a basis for enforcing commitments, in part as a consequence of sympathy with
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Thus, even though the corollaries concerning illusory promises,
mutuality of obligation, and past and moral consideration are still conceptualized and used as gatekeepers, past experience has revealed a
number of circumstances in which it is undesirable that they be consistent gatekeepers. Still, defenders of the corollaries might argue that
there is nothing unusual or wrong with a clear rule qualified by a welldefined and limited set of exceptions. The cases in the relevant time
period, however, cannot be characterized as the application of clear rules
with well-defined exceptions. The corollaries to the doctrine of consideration fight with their exceptions on a regular basis. 387 An examination
of the cases reveals patterns of uneven application, as well as applications of the oversimplified version of the corollary as a gatekeeper when
any justification for that function is absent.
1.

PAST CONSIDERATION/MORAL CONSIDERATION

One class of cases in which the doctrine of past consideration systematically yields undesirable results has already been identified. In
cases involving guaranties executed subsequent to a loan, the doctrine of
past consideration introduces considerable incoherence into the law governing lenders and borrowers and appears to frustrate normal business
expectations. The disruptive work of the doctrine of past consideration
is not, however, confined to garden-variety business cases. Dementas v.
Estate of Tallas388 is one disturbing example.

Jack Tallas was a

wealthy, "self-made" man. 389 For the last fourteen years of his life, he
was assisted in some respects by a close friend, Peter Dementas. 390 A
little less than two months before his death, Tallas met with Dementas
" ' In it, Tallas
and dictated a memorandum to him in his native Greek.39
acknowledged his friendship with Dementas, as well as a variety of services performed by Dementas. 92 Tallas also acknowledged his indebtedrelational contract theory. If one stops viewing contracts as "discrete transactions," Bayles
argued, the receipt of a past benefit and a current commitment can be viewed as a single
interaction. Such exchanges over time may be "plus sum interactions" as easily as conventional
bargains. See Bayles, supra note 267, at 332-33. Even more recently, Professors Yorio and Thel
have suggested that the cases in which promises based on past benefits are enforced are reflections

of a general judicial tendency to enforce serious, well-considered promises. The past benefit, in
such cases, is important as an indication of the seriousness of the promisor's commitment. See
generally Yorio & Thel, supra note 5.

387. See infra notes 387-461 and accompanying text.
388. 764 P.2d 628 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
389. Tallas emigrated to the United States from Greece in 1914 and, over a period of almost

seventy years, achieved considerable financial success as an insurance agent and landlord. Id. at
629.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 631.
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ness to Dementas, as a result of those services, in the amount of
$50,000, and Tallas expressed his intent to change his will to leave
Dementas that amount.393 Tallas kept the Greek memorandum, translated it into English and typed it himself, notarized it with his own
notary seal, and gave it to Dementas three days later.394 Tallas died
without changing his will, and Dementas filed a claim against the
estate.395 Denial of Dementas' claim was affirmed, in part because the
past services recited in the document constituted mere past
consideration.396
It is very difficult, however, to see why Tallas's promise to pay
Dementas $50,000 should not have been enforced. There is no doubt
that the promise was made; it was available in two languages in writing.
The promisor was apparently a sophisticated businessman, fully capable
of appreciating the serious consequences of his promise. While he was
obviously near death, the trial court specifically found that the memorandum was executed free from fraud, duress, or undue influence.39 7
The promise apparently was made with sufficient deliberation and caution, as it took three days to get it in final form. Notarization by the
promisor also suggests awareness of potential serious consequences and
reflects an intent to be bound. Even to those who see a role for the
doctrine of consideration in the performance of evidentiary, cautionary,
and channeling functions, 398 it must be perfectly obvious that any need
for the doctrine was absent from the case. If Tallas wished to acknowledge that the benefits he had received were more than just casual favors
and created an obligation worth $50,000, traditional restitution principles or the implications of relational theory should be broad enough to
give effect to his intention. 399 Indeed, there are other virtually identical
cases in which such promises have been enforced. 4" Even the court in
393. Id.
394. Id. at 629.

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id.
Id. at 629-30, 633.
Id. at 629.
See Fuller, supra note 77.
See Bayles, supra note 267, at 332-33 (suggesting essential continuity in reasons for

enforcing conventional bargains and promises based on past consideration).
400. See, e.g., Estate of Wessels, 561 N.E.2d 1212 (I11. App. Ct. 1990). In Wessels, a daughter

recovered on a written promise by her father to pay, not only for services subsequent to-the date of
the writing, but those rendered for the ten years preceding the execution of the document. As in
Dementas, the promisee was able to prove not only the existence of the promise, but the fairness
of the circumstances of its execution, including representation by counsel. The document recited
the services rendered, acknowledged their receipt in the expectation of payment and their value,
and promised to pay them out of the promisor's estate. The court enforced the promise. Oddly
enough, it did so on the grounds that the recitation that the services had been received in
expectation of payment showed that the father and daughter had an oral contract, supported by
consideration, all along and that the subsequent document just cleared up details as to the amount,
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Dementas acknowledged criticism of the harsh results produced by
applications of the doctrine of past consideration." 1 Its sole excuse for
retaining it was that the legal recognition of "mere moral" obligations
would "erode to the vanishing point the necessity for finding considera-

tion.""4 2 Even if the court were correct in its assertion that enforcing
cases
Tallas's promise would put an end to the doctrine of consideration,
4°3
such as this make its demise a somewhat appealing prospect.
It thus appears that the doctrine of past consideration is not only
superfluous in most of the cases in which it blocks the enforcement of
undesirable promises; it also blocks enforcement of promises that it
would be desirable to enforce. At the very least, the courts have not
fared well in distinguishing the doctrine from its supposedly uncontroversial exceptions, and a clear risk of underenforcement has been
created.

2.

ILLUSORY PROMISES AND NON-STANDARD

REQUIREMENTS

CONTRACTS

The rule that illusory promises cannot be consideration creates a

similar risk of underenforcement in at least two types of cases: those
involving nonstandard requirements contracts and those involving conditions precedent formulated in terms of the "satisfaction" of one of the
parties. An example of the former is provided by Propane Industrial,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp.4 4 The agreement at issue was a standby
propane supply contract for General Motors's Fairfax assembly plant in
manner and timing of compensation. All of this was obviously a fiction used to justify recovery
on restitution principles. The court conceded that the recitation of the "expectation of payment" in
the post-service document was "about the only evidence on the point." Thus, its holding is
tantamount to establishing a right to restitution on the basis of a subsequent, written promise to
pay for a benefit which is acknowledged to be of value. The same principles would have justified
recovery in Dementas.
401. 764 P.2d at 633.
402. Id. at 633 n.8.
403. Promises to pay extra compensation to employees whose service has been particularly
meritorious raise similar problems. Typically, courts apply the doctrine of past consideration and
reject attempts to enforce such promises without inquiring whether the past services really were of
greater benefit than the parties originally contemplated or whether restitution principles should
permit recovery. See, e.g., Kelsoe v. International Wood Prods.. 588 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 1991)
(promise to transfer five percent of corporate stock to employee); Spickelmier Indus. v. Passander,
359 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (promise by financially strapped company to pay bonus to
key employees for loyalty). Again, the reasons for creating exceptions to the rule on past
consideration would seem to justify enforcement of such promises. In addition, many such
promises are simply adjustments to a relationship based on conventional bargain. Critics of the
preexisting duty rule have argued persuasively that such adjustments should be recognized and
enforced even when they do not meet traditional tests for consideration. See, e.g., Reiter, supra
note 17, at 455-58.
404. 429 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
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Kansas City, Missouri. 4 5 The Fairfax plant, at the time of the events in
question, used natural gas as its primary source of heat. 4° The local gas
utility, however, was occasionally forced to interrupt gas service to the
plant. 4 7 Accordingly, GM was required to maintain a standby supply of
propane fuel for use on such occasions. 4 8 The plaintiff propane dealer
("Industrial") had been supplying GM
since 1970, although GM did not
4°
buy exclusively from the plaintiff.
The lawsuit arose out of GM's arrangements for the winter of
1973-74.410 After Industrial quoted GM a "guaranteed firm" price of
$.17 per gallon on a standby supply of 500,000 gallons of propane, GM
issued a purchase order for a "possible requirement" of 500,000 gallons
"to be used as standby fuel" during the heating season.41' The purchase
order, which was executed by both parties and contained an integration
clause, reflected the "firm price" Industrial had quoted and provided for
delivery only "as released" by GM.4 12 In the summer of 1973 (before
any releases), Industrial sent GM a letter apparently repudiating the contract.413 The letter informed GM that, because of fuel shortages, Industrial could only obtain propane at a cost in excess of the contract price
and that Industrial would, accordingly, be "unable to fulfill our contract. ' 414 GM replied with a letter that demanded performance in
accordance with the purchase order.41 5
In September, GM issued its first "release" for a definite quantity,
and Industrial refused to deliver on the grounds that the federal government was about to enact a mandatory propane allocation program and
had requested voluntary compliance prior to enactment.41 6 The program
was, in fact, enacted, and GM did not qualify as a priority user under the
scheme of allocation priorities.41 7 GM, however, submitted a proposed
schedule of its propane requirements to Industrial, and Industrial
requested a hardship exception from federal authorities. 4 ' 8 The federal
government granted the request and directed Industrial to supply
171,000 gallons of propane to GM "on financial terms acceptable to
405. Id. at 216.
406. Id. at 215.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 216.
410. Id.

411. Id.
412. Id.

413. Id. at 217.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.

418. Id. at 217-18.
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both parties."4 19 Without further discussion of price, Industrial delivered over 75,000 gallons and billed GM at a price of more than $.40 per
gallon. When GM would pay only the original contract price of $.17 per
gallon, Industrial sued for the difference.420
The court held that Industrial was entitled to recover. 42 The court
initially found that the purchase order failed for lack of consideration.422
Once the written contract was out of the way, the court's work was quite
easy. The shipment and acceptance of propane amounted to conduct
reflecting an intent to contract with an open price term within the meaning of U.C.C. § 2-305.423 Accordingly, in the absence of an express
agreement on price, the court was free to imply a "reasonable price at
the time for delivery. '4 24 The price demanded by Industrial was apparently the going rate, because GM did not contest its reasonableness.425
The critical link in the court's reasoning was the finding that the
written purchase order, although executed by both parties, failed for lack
of consideration. The court was troubled by the fact that the purchase
order referred to a "possible" requirement and provided for delivery only
as "released. 426 The final nail in the coffin, however, was that the
purchase order did not require GM to buy exclusively from Industrial.427
GM was free to buy propane from other suppliers, as it had done the
previous year. Furthermore, GM had another standby propane contract
with a rival supplier for the 1973-74 season.428 In the court's view, this
made GM's commitment to buy its requirements illusory,42 9 which, in
turn, implied that the purchase order failed for lack of mutuality of
419. Id. at 218.
420. Id.

421. Id. at 222.
422. Id. at 218-21.
423. Id. at 221.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 219. The court seemed to view both the adjective "possible" and the phrase "as
released" as evidence of a reservation by GM of absolute discretion whether to perform. Neither

need be so interpreted. The purchase order in question was negotiated and filled in by
businessmen, not lawyers, and there are obvious interpretations of both of the quoted expressions
that do not make performance absolutely discretionary. The reference to a "possible" requirement
may have been nothing more than an allusion to the fact that GM's requirements were contingent
upon the vagaries of the weather and consequent interruptions in the supply of natural gas. The
"as released" delivery term may have reflected nothing more than a limited storage capacity for

propane.
427. Id. at 218-21.
428. Id. at 216-17, 220-21.
429. The court's opinion does not use the term "illusory promise," but it is fairly clear that the

court rested its decision on the same concept. The court noted initially that "requirement" can
mean either "all needed" or only "all desired" and concluded that GM had made "no express or

implied promise to purchase any propane from plaintiff." Id. at 220-21.
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obligation.43 °
It must be conceded that GM's negotiating position was a bit more
inflexible than might be expected of a party dealing with a long-term
trading partner faced with acute product shortages. It is, therefore, a bit
uncomfortable to try to generate sympathy for "poor little GM." Nevertheless, the court's classification of GM's commitment as illusory and
consequent invalidation of the contract are troubling for several reasons.
First, given GM's needs, it is difficult to fault the way GM had arranged
for its propane supply. Since GM only needed propane if and when its
natural gas supply was interrupted and since such interruptions were presumably unpredictable, a fixed quantity contract was out of the question.
Some form of requirements contract was necessary. Moreover, it seems
likely that GM's needs might be larger than any single supplier would be
willing to commit on a standby basis. The court's opinion reflects that
GM had purchased propane from three suppliers the preceding year, and,
both in the preceding year and during the 1973-74 heating season, GM's
needs exceeded the half million gallons covered by the purchase
order." 3t It therefore seems likely that multiple requirements contracts
were necessary.
Multiple requirements contracts for the same commodity present
the problem of allocation of the buyer's orders among suppliers. The
court was right to worry about that issue. The implication of the court's
classification of GM's commitment as illusory, however, is that there
can be only one possible solution to the problem: A party in GM's position must draft its requirements contracts in sequence, designating a primary, secondary, and tertiary supplier. Thus, the purchase order at issue
in the Propane Industrial case could only have been saved if it had
required GM to buy the first half million gallons of its requirements
exclusively from Industrial. At that point, a second exclusive requirements contract could be triggered without endangering the enforceability
of the first. Absent exclusivity, there can be no valid requirements contract, total or partial.432
430. Id. at 219, 221.
431. Id. at 217.

432. Id. at 219. Ironically, the facts before the court would have supported a conclusion that
such a sequential series of exclusive partial requirements contracts was precisely what the parties
had intended. The previous winter, when GM had purchased propane from three suppliers, the
orders to Industrial had exceeded half a million gallons, nearly double the volume ordered from
both alternate suppliers combined. Id. at 216-17. Moreover, for the 1973-74 winter, GM's partial
requirements contract with the only alternate supplier contained an escape clause, while the
contract with Industrial did not. GM issued a purchase order to the alternate supplier, Enterprise
Products Company, for 1,600,000 gallons at a price of $0.15463 per gallon. However, the
agreement also contained a provision allowing GM either to buy out of the purchase obligation
entirely by paying $0.035 per gallon or to delay delivery for a year by paying $0.045 per gallon
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The court's insistence on sequential exclusivity to avoid an illusory
promise on one side is simply unjustified. The drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code recognized the utility of flexible business arrangements and specifically rejected the notion that requirements contracts
generally lacked either "mutuality of obligation" or sufficient definiteness.4 33 They concluded that the limitation of good faith was enough to
ensure that the party reserving flexibility was genuinely committed to
the particular deal.4 34 In the case of requirements and output contracts,
moreover, the drafters gave the notion of good faith even greater specificity by giving it a special gloss. Good faith, in that context, means
reasonable proportionality to any stated estimate or to prior experience.4 31 In Propane Industrial, however, there was arguably enough

prior experience to construct an enforceable obligation on the part of
GM and thus to avoid a finding of lack of mutuality.436 Since both
Industrial and the alternate supplier had been GM suppliers previously,
the court could have found that good faith required that the overall proportion of orders allocated between them remain roughly constant from
year to year,4 37 and that should have been enough to avoid a finding that

GM's commitment was illusory. The further requirement that one of
them be designated the primary supplier and the exclusive recipient of
orders up to a certain level is more than the notion of good faith
requires. 438
plus freight charges. Id. at 217. Thus the court could have found that GM was bound to buy its
first half million gallons from Industrial and the remainder of its requirements from the alternate
supplier.
433. U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (1989).
434. Id.
435. U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
436. The Propane Industrial agreement may not have been the "plain vanilla" requirements
contract one normally encounters in cases involving U.C.C. § 2-306. The reasons that led the
drafters to recognize simpler requirements contracts, however, apply to the Propane Industrial
agreement as well.
437. This standard would be satisfied as long as, at the end of the heating season, the orders
placed with Industrial and the alternate supplier were in roughly the same ratio as the previous
season. GM could, however, alternate ordering from Industrial and the alternate supplier in any
sequence and would not be required to order all quantities up to a stated maximum from a single
supplier before placing any orders with the other.
438. The analysis in the text should not be understood to imply that all nonexclusive partial
requirements contracts will be enforceable. Where prior dealings or other factual bases for giving
content to the notion of good faith are absent, such an agreement might fail for indefiniteness.
See, e.g., Billings Cottonseed, Inc. v. Albany Oil Mill, Inc., 328 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
The contract at issue provided that the buyer (Billings) would purchase from the seller (Albany)
cottonseed "sufficient to meet all reasonable requirements" at a price "to be mutually determined
from time to time by the parties." Id. at 428. The agreement had been in effect for only three
months when a dispute arose. In the subsequent action, the court held the agreement
unenforceable. The court devoted most of its opinion to an argument that the absence of a
commitment to buy exclusively from Albany made Billings's commitment a mere promise to
purchase when it wanted to do so and therefore deprived the agreement of mutuality of obligation.
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Finally, and most importantly, the court's erroneous conclusion that
GM's commitment was illusory and its consequent invalidation of the
agreement for lack of mutuality kept it from seeing the issues which
should have been the battleground of the case. The problem with the
Industrial/GM contract was not that it was not a genuine exchange from
the outset. The real problem was that the exchange had become so disadvantageous to Industrial. Because of product shortages and cost
increases, performance had become much more onerous than Industrial
had initially contemplated. Accordingly, at least for the period before
federal allocation regulations went into effect, the court should have
analyzed the case under U.C.C. § 2-615 and determined whether or not
increased costs had made Industrial's performance commercially
impracticable. Arguments could presumably have been mustered on
both sides of that question.4 39 Later, when the federal allocation pro-

gram was enacted, the court should have analyzed the extent to which
the federal rationing scheme preempted the pricing provisions of
existing contracts; any price implications of the regulations; and, in the
absence of any specific price implications of the federal scheme, the
effect of the prior Industrial/GM agreement on post-regulatory transactions with an open price term. The court's use of the "illusory promise"
corollary to the doctrine of consideration not only led it to the erroneous
conclusion that the original agreement was unenforceable but also
However, the court also found that the parties had not intended to be bound in the absence of an
agreement on price on each occasion. Therefore, the agreement also failed under U.C.C. § 2305(4).
The result reached in Billings could be questioned, particularly since the use of the phrase
"reasonable requirements" extends an open invitation to a court to imply a quantity term using
some objective standard. But given the extremely brief experience of the parties and the absence
of any factual record indicating a usage of trade, it may have been impossible for the court to find
a basis for implying how much cottonseed Billings was obligated to buy. Moreover, the failure to
agree on a price made the court's task even more difficult. If the result in Billings is correct,
however, it is because the agreement at issue was indefinite. The whole discussion of mutuality of
obligation and consideration was superfluous. See also De los Santos v. Great W. Sugar Co., 348
N.W.2d 842 (Neb. 1984) (nonexclusive hauling contract requiring trucker to haul "such tonnage
of beets as may be loaded by the Company" held lacking in mutuality; no course of dealing
supported plaintiff trucker's claim of right to haul greater quantities than allocated by defendant).
439. On the one hand, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code recognized that mere cost
increases do not justify relief from performance obligations on ground of commercial
impracticability, because the risk of price fluctuation is exactly what fixed price contracts are
normally intended to allocate. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4. Indeed, in the case under discussion,
the plaintiff supplier had quoted a "guaranteed firm" price, and the purchase order executed by
both parties expressly referred to a "firm price." Propane Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 429
F. Supp. 214, 216 (W.D. Mo. 1977). On the other hand, the drafters also recognized as a ground
for relief "a severe shortage" due to various listed contingencies. It may very well be that, given
the appropriate opportunity, Industrial could have made a case for relief under § 2-615. See
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4. The court's disposition of the case on the basis of the doctrine of
consideration prevented a full development of the relevant factual support for both sides of the
argument.
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obscured the truly dispositive issues and, in all probability, prevented
the development of an adequate factual record. 40
3.

ILLUSORY PROMISES AND SATISFACTION CLAUSES

The application of the doctrine of illusory promises to a contractual
obligation defined in terms of the satisfaction of one of the parties can
lead to equally unacceptable results. An example is provided by Stone
Mountain Properties, Ltd. v. Helmer."' The contract at issue was an
ordinary contract for the sale of land by a limited partnership (Stone
Mountain) to an individual (Mitchell). 4 2 The land in question was
apparently commercial property, and the only even mildly unusual
aspect of the transaction was a "special stipulation" subjecting the sale
to a condition precedent." 3 Specifically, the sale was contingent on
Mitchell's ability to obtain approval from the Seaboard Airline Railroad
to run a spur line to the property "at a location satisfactory to the purchaser."' 4 Mitchell had ninety days to secure such approval and notify
the seller of the satisfaction of the condition."45
Seventy days later, Mitchell had made no formal application to the
railroad, and Stone Mountain's general partner was apparently nervous. 44 6 Another potential purchaser had offered to buy the same property, and the general partner was afraid Mitchell no longer had time to
obtain railroad approval for a spur line. 447 The new potential purchaser's offer had an extremely short deadline, and the general partner
sold the land to Mitchell's rival without informing Mitchell." 8 Nine
days later, still within the 90-day period specified in the Mitchell/Stone
Mountain contract, Mitchell obtained a plat of a spur line, which his
agent informed him would be acceptable to the railroad."49 Mitchell
notified Stone Mountain in writing that the condition precedent stated in
the contract had been satisfied and that he was ready to perform.4 5 °
Stone Mountain mailed a response purporting to declare the agreement
"null and void" and directing Mitchell's real estate agent to return his
440. Cf. Gull Lab. v. Diagnostic Technology, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Utah 1988)
(invalidating apparently ordinary requirements contract and licensing agreement on ground that
failure to state minimum quantity made buyer's promise illusory).
441. 229 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
442. Id. at 781.
443. Id.
444. Id.

445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 781-82.

449. Id. at 782.
450. Id.
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earnest money.45 '
Both Mitchell and his real estate agent sued Stone Mountain and all
of its partners individually.452 The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs
on summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed.453 The court
held that the agreement was, from its inception, void for lack of mutuality of obligation.454 The condition defined in terms of the satisfaction of
the buyer made the agreement "contingent upon an event that may or
may not happen at the pleasure of the buyer. '455 The illusory nature of
Mitchell's commitment deprived the agreement of mutuality of obligation,456 and Stone Mountain's promise to sell was, at that point, a mere
unaccepted offer to sell.4 57 Ironically, Mitchell's subsequent declaration
of his satisfaction with the location of the spur line would normally have
removed the condition from the ambit of his discretion and thereby
would have restored mutuality of obligation to the agreement.458 There
was, however, evidence of record that Mitchell had received word that
the property had been sold prior to his declaration of satisfaction.459
While a remand was necessary to take further evidence upon the issue,
the court was clear that, if Mitchell's knowledge of the sale to the rival
purchaser preceded his declaration of satisfaction, Stone Mountain's
offer to sell had been properly revoked while it was unsupported by
consideration.460
The disposition of the case appears extremely difficult to justify for
several reasons. First, the condition precedent defined in terms of
Mitchell's satisfaction was arguably a reasonable business arrangement,
given his apparent needs. It must be assumed that a spur line was necessary to make the property desirable for commercial uses. Given the
variety of potential commercial uses, as well as the variety of engineering variables and the unpredictability of negotiations with the railroad, it
is obvious Mitchell could not define the condition in terms of a specific
location. At the time of the agreement, he presumably could not know
where he wanted the spur line. Moreover, if engineering work was
required to ascertain the desirable and feasible locations, Mitchell may
not have thought it worth investing the time and money to find out
where he wanted the line until after he had the agreement in hand. Thus,
451. Id.
452. Id.

453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

782, 785.
782-83.
782-83, 784.
783.
784.

458. Id. at 783-85.

459. Id. at 785.
460. Id.
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there is a perfectly reasonable business explanation for the use of a condition precedent defined in terms of Mitchell's satisfaction.4"6 '
Moreover, the court's conclusion that a satisfaction clause amounts
to the reservation of absolutely unfettered discretion whether to perform
is simply mistaken. At the very least, such a clause can be interpreted to
require subjective good faith, resulting in a breach if the party whose
satisfaction is critical refuses to proceed when he is, in fact, satisfied.
The court concluded that a subjective interpretation of a satisfaction
clause entails that the purchaser is the "sole judge" of his own satisfaction and thus may perform or refuse to perform at will. But even if the
condition defined in terms of Mitchell's satisfaction with the spur line
location meant what would in fact meet with Mitchell's approval, rather
than what a reasonable person would approve, evidence regarding what
a reasonable person would accept would certainly have been relevant
had Mitchell denied he was satisfied. Thus, while a person can lie or tell
the truth about whether a satisfaction clause has been fulfilled, it is possible to muster evidence that he is lying. Determining which he is doing
is not different from the ordinary credibility determinations concerning
mental states that triers of fact are asked to make all the time in a variety
of areas of law. In short, a promise subject to a condition defined in
terms of one party's satisfaction is enough of a commitment that it is
possible to define and ascertain when it has been breached. If, as suggested above, there are business reasons to include such conditions in
contracts, it seems senseless to classify them as illusory and invalidate
461. Mitchell could have "tied up" the property long enough for engineering work or studies
through the use of an option. Options defined in terms of the satisfaction of one party have also
run afoul of the doctrine of consideration, however. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Brodsky, 788 S.W. 2d
156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). In Culbertson, a landowner granted a prospective purchaser a sixty-day
option in return for the purchaser's delivery of a $5000 earnest money check to a title company.
The title company was required to hold the check in escrow while the prospective purchaser
conducted feasibility and engineering studies. If, during the sixty-day period, the purchaser found
the property unacceptable, he could terminate the agreement and demand return of the earnest
money check. Although the appellate court recognized the possibility of a valid contract
containing a promise conditioned on the satisfaction of one party, it concluded that the agreement
gave the prospective purchaser absolute discretion whether to perform. Even the purchaser's
insistence that the satisfaction clause was subject to a limitation of good faith did not sufficiently
circumscribe his discretion. Accordingly, the option failed for lack of mutuality of obligation.
Although the purchaser in Culbertson did seem to reserve greater flexibility than Mitchell did in
Stone Mountain, the criticism of Stone Mountain in the text applies with equal force to
Culbertson. Particularly in the case of options, it is difficult to see why the kind of 60-day "free
look" contemplated in Culbertson should not be enforced, even though the prospective seller is
bound while the purchaser is not. The need for feasibility studies and for some assurance the land
will be available at the conclusion of such studies seems ample justification for such an
arrangement. Indeed the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recommend the
enforcement of options containing a mere recital of consideration, thus making mere form
decisive in favor of enforceability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a)
(1979).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:45

the contracts in question for lack of consideration. The effect of doing
so in Stone Mountain was to permit the defendant's general partner to
repudiate a perfectly sensible agreement because he was subjected to
time pressure by a third party and because he did not like the way Mitchell went about securing railroad approval of a spur line.462
D.

An Advance Response to Fanciful Hypotheticals

The analysis of the actual operation of the four corollaries to the
doctrine of consideration thus suggests the following general conclusions. In each of the cases in which one of the corollaries produces a
desirable case disposition, there is another doctrine that leads (or could
lead) the court to the same disposition. In cases in which the corollaries
are not redundant, they produce undesirable results. In sum, real cases
suggest that the corollaries have little merit.
Informal discussion of the foregoing conclusions with various colleagues has provoked the same response on several occasions. In each
discussion, one of my colleagues spins a hypothetical involving a promise that may not be desirable to enforce and that only the corollaries to
the doctrine of consideration could invalidate. The point of such
hypotheticals is to suggest the danger of abandoning the corollaries.
There can be no objection, in the abstract, to the use of such
hypotheticals in argument.463 One may, however, object to hypotheticals that are so stripped of factual detail that there is no way to answer
them. My experience to date suggests that, when sufficient factual detail
is included in a hypothetical that one can realistically imagine it occurring, it ceases to provide support for the corollaries to the doctrine of
consideration.
For example, one colleague invented the following hypothetical:
Suppose a painter promises a homeowner to paint the latter's house.
In return, the homeowner promises to pay the painter only if he so
desires. The painter changes his mind and refuses to paint the house.
Should the painter's promise be enforced?"
The homeowner's "promise" is obviously illusory, and classical
contract theory would imply that it could not be consideration for the
462. Cf. Tuggle v. Wilson, 280 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (real estate contract subject to
ambiguous condition held lacking in mutuality and indefinite, even though party entitled to invoke
condition contended it was fulfilled), rev'd, 282 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 1981); Spellman v. Lyons
Petroleum, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (alleged oil and gas lease held void for lack
of mutuality where draft given in payment was subject to approval of title and lease or mineral
deed and contained exculpatory clause in the event it was not paid within ten days).
463. At least one who tells new tales of Sherlock and Mycroft Holmes cannot object to the use
of hypotheticals.
464. The hypothetical was created by my colleague, Paul Barron.
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painter's promise. The painter's promise would, accordingly, be unenforceable. Moreover, faced with only the foregoing facts, the initial,
intuitive reaction of most commentators would probably be that the
painter's promise should not be enforced. I suggest, however, that such
an intuitive response is based on the fact that the deal is very unfair. It is
so one-sided that one immediately suspects that the painter did not
understand the illusory character of the homeowner's promise or that the
homeowner deceived him or subjected him to unfair bargaining
pressure.
The response of the hypothetical spinner to these suspicions is to
assume them away. The hypothetical is now to include the facts that the
painter has been neither deceived nor bullied and that he understands
that the homeowner has reserved absolute discretion on the matter of
payment. At this point, the hypothetical is quite puzzling, and one has
an overwhelming urge to ask why the painter is making such a silly
promise. Is he joking? Is he drunk? Again, the hypothetical spinner
responds by assuming away any lack of serious intent or any potential
incapacity.
Surely, however, it is fair to ask the hypothetical spinner for the
painter's reason for making the promise. The explanation given in the
actual discussion of this hypothetical was that the painter has never
painted a house in the homeowner's neighborhood before, and he wants
a sample of his work for all in the neighborhood to see. He hopes to
generate future business in this fashion.
Now it is plausible to view the hypothetical as something that could
really happen. At the same time, however, it is plausible to argue that
the painter's promise should be enforced. If the painter told the homeowner why he was willing to paint the house in return for an illusory
promise, even a classical theorist could presumably find an enforceable
bargain. The homeowner has given up his undoubted legal right to
exclude the painter from his land and home, and he has therefore suffered the legal "detriment" necessary to constitute consideration. The
homeowner has, in effect, loaned the painter the surface of his house.
If the painter communicates the reason for his promise to the homeowner, the hypothetical is an instance of a type of transaction involving
an illusory promise that Professor Eisenberg considers both commercially useful and appropriately enforceable.465 The painter, according to
Professor Eisenberg's analysis, is bargaining for a unilateral contract. 466
The act for which he is bargaining is literally the "act" of giving him a
465. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. Rv. 640,
649-51 (1982).
466. Id. at 649-50. Professor Eisenberg's own hypothetical involves a law student with
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chance. 46 7 To refuse to enforce his promise because the return promise
is illusory is to confuse a successful unilateral contract with an unsuccessful bilateral contract. 68
The hypothetical spinner's final move is to add the fact that the
painter has not told the homeowner why he is willing to paint the house
in exchange for an illusory promise. The hypothetical is therefore no
longer an example of an express bargain. Nevertheless, in my view, it is
still appropriate to enforce the painter's promise. It is a business promise made deliberately in the hope of gaining a business advantage. Even
if it is not a bargain, it is similar enough to a bargain to generate the
same kind of expectations 469 and to merit similar enforcement.
It thus appears that, when the hypothetical is fleshed out with sufficient factual detail to make it realistic, it fails to suit its author's purpose.
It is not an example of an undesirable promise that only the doctrine of
consideration can invalidate. My own experience with other hypotheticals is similar. The more detailed and realistic a hypothetical becomes,
the less it supports retention of the corollaries. Legal scholars are a creative group, and one cannot eliminate the possibility that someone will
invent a hypothetical in which a corollary to the doctrine of consideration is necessary to invalidate an undesirable promise. However, it is
appropriate to insist that any such hypothetical contain sufficient factual
detail that one can realistically imagine it occurring. Only then can the
likelihood of its occurrence be assessed and the hypothetical harm in
abandoning the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration be balanced
against the real harm they now cause in real cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this Article suggests that the four corollaries to the doctrine of consideration have little to recommend them. In
cases in which they lead to desirable invalidation of promises, there is
usually an alternate doctrine, ranging from the assent doctrines to various defenses based on promisee misbehavior, that also provides a
defense to the promise at issue. In cases in which the corollaries are not
redundant, however, they appear to cause more trouble than they are
worth. When used as substitutes for a proper analysis of a misconductsubstandard grades whose offer to work for a prestigious firm at a reduced salary is coupled with

the grant of an unlimited termination right to the firm.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 649.
469. It might be objected that the painter's promise has not resulted in any benefit to the

painter or induced any reliance on the part of the homeowner. The same, however, is true of any
conventional bargain that is repudiated while still completely executory. If ordinary executory

contracts are enforced, the same reasons support enforcement of the painter's promise.
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based defense or a public policy question, they obscure the true factual
or policy issues and lead to dubious case dispositions. Even apart from
their pretextual use, however, the corollaries lead to errors of substance.
The rule on past consideration leads to underenforcement of subsequent
guaranties and produces errors in the application of promissory estoppel
and restitution theories. The rules on illusory promises and mutuality of
obligation lead to underenforcement of useful business arrangements
requiring a great deal of flexibility in performance, including non-standard requirements contracts and contracts containing conditions defined
in terms of one party's satisfaction. Finally, neither the corollaries nor
the general requirement of bargain seem well-adapted to perform the one
gatekeeping function which all agree is required: the isolation of the
class of promises too casual to be enforced. If the doctrine of consideration still has any merit, it is not to be found in the four rules discussed in
this Article.

